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Executive Summary 
 
OVERVIEW 
 
In September 2013 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Rebecca Hersman requested that the Naval War College conduct a PSI table top game 
in May 2014 in conjunction with a meeting of the PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG).  It was 
specifically requested that the game explore critical challenges and opportunities in counter-
proliferation interdiction, and identify capacity building tools that may be shared with the broader 
PSI community.  
 
Members of the Naval War College (NWC) Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS), particularly 
from the Strategic Research Department, War Gaming Department, and Office of Naval 
Intelligence Detachment, worked with Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) personnel and 
members of the U.S. interagency to design a game that would facilitate deeper comprehension of 
and actionable recommendations related to key interdiction trends, decisions, and practices among 
PSI member states.  The PSI game was conducted during the PSI Operational Expert Group 
(OEG) meeting held 13-15 May 2014 at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. 
Delegations from the following PSI OEG states participated: Argentina, Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
 
The four objectives for the PSI 14 table top game were: 
 Build a shared appreciation for how ratification and eventual entry into force of the Beijing 
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation 
changes the status quo with respect to counter-proliferation laws, policies, practices, and 
obligations 
 Build a shared understanding of international standards, national laws, policies, and 
terminology related to shipments in transit and transshipment among PSI member states. 
 Build a shared understanding for the key issues and challenges related to disposition and 
liability aspects of PSI and how national laws, policies and procedures differ amongst PSI 
OEG member states. 
 Identify changes to existing critical capabilities and procedure (CCP) tools or potential new 
CCP tools as it relates to the three above objectives. 
DESIGN & STRUCTURE 
 
PSI 2014 was designed as a two-move, one-sided, professionally-facilitated seminar style event 
played over two days. Participants examined multiple proliferation scenarios as both country teams 
and as functional groups. Functional groups were divided into the following areas of player 
expertise: law enforcement, military, legal, and diplomatic. Both country teams and functional 
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groups were slated to explore two scenarios consisting of three proliferation events over the course 
of two days, but time constraints forced many country teams to only focus on two of the three. The 
flexible nature of this game design enabled players to maximize opportunities for exploration, 
learning, and interaction while simultaneously playing multiple proliferation streams. Each move 
consisted of a scenario brief, a scenario update, generation of an initial assessment followed by a 
country or functional course of action, and finally, a moderated group plenary discussion for all 
players to present their respective courses of actions and discuss any issues associated with them. On 
the morning of the third day, all players participated in a combined super plenary session to discuss 
key issues and insights derived from game play. 
 
FINDINGS & IMPLICATIONS 
 
Players recognized the benefit of relying on existing international law and partnerships to conduct 
interdictions in international waters and airspace.  Players advocated for initially leveraging existing 
national laws to interdict vessels or aircraft passing through their territories, where they have 
jurisdiction to act. In other game situations, players relied on UN Security Council Resolutions, the 
Beijing Convention (posited as in force in the second move of the game), the SUA Convention, and 
the Chemical Weapons Convention as authorization to interdict a ship or aircraft suspected of 
carrying items of proliferation concern. There was broad consensus that the Beijing Convention 
should be adopted and standardized internationally. One player said, “The Beijing Convention sets 
an international standard that everyone needs to reach. We need to aid other PSI endorsees on this 
standard.”  Conversely, players acknowledged that the Beijing Convention does not provide a 
method to interdict WM-related information transported on a person in transit.  
 
Players recognized the need to develop a deeper understanding of which national and international 
laws and policies can be applied to counter proliferation events related to transit and transshipment. 
Understanding each country’s definition and approach to transit and transshipment was 
characterized as a necessary step towards furthering cooperation. Tracking licenses of cargo traveling 
from origin to destination when a vessel or aircraft is in a place of transit or transshipment was also 
touted as an area of emphasis for civilian and military decision-makers. 
 
The PSI critical capabilities and practices construct needs to be strengthened in order to help 
countries to better inform their leaders in time sensitive decision-making environments. PSI 
Operational Experts Group countries acknowledged the benefit of strengthening critical interdiction 
capabilities and practices of all PSI member states. Several countries suggested sharing a subset of 
CCP tools with non-PSI states as an incentive to join the PSI community and commit to the 
interdiction principles. Establishing common processes and technologies will help facilitate the 
sharing of information and knowledge by various departments and agencies within PSI member 
states.  Players highlighted many challenges to developing best practices and focused on solutions 
that capture lessons learned and updating check lists in real-time, phrasing lessons in terms of 
generic, actionable recommendations or tasks, and proactively encouraging PSI-endorsing states to 
review and integrate CCP updates into national plans and policies. Such lessons should be both 
 
 
E-3 
 
positive and negative and acquired and documented quickly to avoid individuals forgetting the 
challenges faced during the course of a proliferation event.  
  
Supporting the development and management of PSI CCP tools requires that organizations and 
agencies of PSI endorsing states encourage the sharing of lessons learned by establishing CCP 
programs, policies, and incentives. The global knowledge of countering WMD proliferation can be 
preserved and transformed by managing a lessons learned database for current and future PSI 
practitioners. To foster greater socialization of best practices, an online discussion feature would 
allow PSI users to interact with each other through online chatting or face-to-face discussions. The 
CCP tool website could also feature an application that allows users to search points of contacts by 
country, agency, name, or area of expertise. This would expedite decision-making and better position 
PSI states to standardize pre-decisional authorities within and across agencies. Being able to quickly 
identify the most appropriate CCP tool and assess its utility after the fact through a user rating 
system and feedback form would help publishers and consumers revise and reuse products for 
future decision-makers. Having gained a deeper appreciation for the complexities of individual 
proliferation events during game play, players advocated for CCP tools that are tailored to counter 
specific scenarios.  
 
Leveraging the CCP Tool management process and characteristics discussed in this report, the PSI 
OEG should further formalize a dedicated CCP Working Group aimed to encourage and manage 
the further development of CCPs that show promise for improving PSI interdiction outcomes. 
Based on the game’s findings, this group could begin by a conducting a thorough review of the 
literature and expert input to create a conceptual framework for planning and improving a PSI CCP 
tool framework that maximizes both the impact to WMD interdiction and the quality of information 
developed for CCPs.  The working group should begin with developing a working, consensus 
definition of best practices, along with criteria and processes for classifying information that 
maximizes both impact and quality of the CCPs.  
 
Several strategic-level impediments to interdiction  highlighted by players include the unwillingness 
of nearby countries to take action to assist a state, the consequences of a country overreacting to an 
interdiction using military force, and the political and operational costs associated with not taking 
any action.  Expanding bilateral boarding agreements between PSI member states was suggested as 
an effective way to secure expedited processes or pre-approval for stopping and searching ships at 
sea. An inspection in a country’s port was preferred over interdiction in territorial waters or on the 
high seas.  States may be less likely to cooperate in international waters where interdiction on the 
high seas requires additional jurisdiction and coordination, particularly in time-compressed 
environments.  Determining violations for the transport of intellectual WMD material may be 
challenging when limited evidence on the person exists.  
 
Persistent intelligence and CCP tool sharing between PSI member states prior to a real-world 
proliferation event will better position national security decision-makers to identify pre-decisional 
authorities and mission tailored force package responses. Information and intelligence sharing 
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through bi-lateral and multilateral agreements and CCP tools are critical enablers to rapidly making 
decisions related to authorities and capabilities in time-constrained environments.  Due to the time 
sensitive nature of real-world PSI events, encouraging rapid decision making through interagency 
coordination bodies within a government is desirable prior to seeking outside assistance or 
coordination. Players highlighted that coordination between customs agencies and the military is 
critical to establishing greater awareness and prepositioning of assets in case the conveyance decides 
to attempt to escape into international waters or airspace.  
 
The use of military assets as a way to deter or respond to any potential military reaction from a 
country of proliferation concern whose cargo is under investigation was also emphasized during 
game play.  Any diversion of suspected cargo would be limited by the laws and the political will of 
the country allowing, for example, the ship into port. Capability and capacity limitations may also 
limit a PSI endorsing state’s ability to conduct surveillance and interdiction missions. Fostering 
cooperation through PSI meetings, table-top exercises, and real-world exercises will strengthen 
relationships between PSI endorsing states, and create new relationships with non-PSI states to 
advance the global community’s interest in preventing the proliferation of WMD.    
 
A state’s ability to respond to a proliferation event requires authorities and political will. Upon 
establishing the requisite authorities and nurturing the political will to prevent WMD or related 
material from reaching illegitimate end-users, states must enhance their awareness of threats and 
ways to respond to these threats through sharing of intelligence and best practices. Counter 
proliferation capabilities that reside on land, air, or sea are best applied when national organizations 
coordinate and cooperate prior to a real-world event. When a nation is limited in one or more of 
these areas, other PSI endorsing states can help that country build their capability to respond to 
future proliferation events. Authorities and political will, awareness, and capabilities can be used as a 
framework to support military and civilian decision-makers develop PSI engagement strategies. The 
amount of emphasis placed in one of these areas depends on the level of contribution and capacity a 
state has in these areas. Sustained cooperation between a state’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their 
military and law enforcement is critical to understanding the strengths and limitations for a country 
to respond to WMD proliferation.  
 
Finally, the illicit use of three-dimensional 3D printing technology as a means to digitally fabricate 
WMD or related material as physical objects was a focus of player discussions. Three-dimensional 
printing offers many potential advantages to proliferators of WMD. It could enable users to build 
objects from scratch more quickly, cheaply, and with less chance of interdiction than using imported 
items. A person or organization could create more complex objects, customize parts, and reverse 
engineer the manufacturing of material that may no longer be readily available at the time and place 
of their choosing.  It did not appear to players that existing national and international laws 
sufficiently regulate the use of 3D printing for the purposes of limiting WMD related material to 
end-users of concern. Capabilities to detect the export and use of this technology and the 
formulation and sharing of intelligence and CCP tools are limited as well.  The proliferation of this 
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technology, to include the printed items, the information, and the 3D printers should be examined at 
future PSI games or events.  
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I. Introduction 
STATEMENT OF SPONSOR’S INTEREST IN THIS TOPIC 
 
The variety of expert PSI meetings and field and tabletop exercises have explored and identified 
ways to strengthen PSI states’ ability to more effectively impede and stop WMD, their delivery 
systems, and related items. However, certain issues, such as ratification of The Convention on the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (Beijing Convention), disposition and 
liability, and the application of critical capabilities and practices (CCPs) tools—were found to require 
additional exploration and work by the PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG). This 
realization—the need for continued improvement in a broad range of analytical tools to better 
understand and address changing proliferation issues— led to the consideration of an analytical 
game as a key part of the next, U.S.-hosted, Operational Experts Group meeting. 
 
In September 2013 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Rebecca Hersman requested that the Naval War College conduct a third PSI table top 
game in May 2014 as part of the OEG meeting. It was specifically requested that the game explore 
critical challenges and opportunities in counter-proliferation interdiction and identify capacity 
building tools that could be shared with the broader PSI community. 
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The evolution of the proliferation environment and counter-proliferation regimes and practices 
create critical issues and challenges that could inhibit PSI endorsing nations to effectively carry out 
their roles as outlined in the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. 
PURPOSE 
The purpose of the 2014 PSI tabletop exercise was to build a shared understanding among 
participating states and examine current key proliferation interdiction challenges and solutions. The 
exercise was then to assist in examining how CCP tools could be modified, improved, or created to 
help address current challenges. 
OBJECTIVES 
Game objectives were determined based on a series of discussions with the game sponsor and 
individual scenarios, and the overall game design, was custom tailored to address the topics involved. 
Objectives were reviewed by the game sponsor to ensure compatibility and game-ability. Game 
objectives and associated research questions were used to drive game design and play.  
 
The four objectives for PSI 14 were as follows: 
 Build a shared appreciation for how ratification and eventual entry into force of the Beijing 
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation 
changes the status quo with respect to counter-proliferation laws, policies, practices, and 
obligations 
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 Build a shared understanding of international standards, national laws, policies, and 
terminology related to shipments in transit and transshipment among PSI member states. 
 Build a shared understanding for the key issues and challenges related to disposition and 
liability aspects of PSI and how national laws, policies and procedures differ amongst PSI 
OEG member states. 
 Identify changes to existing CCP tools or potential new CCP tools as it relates to the three 
above objectives. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based on OSD-Policy’s interest in exploring current proliferation interdiction challenges, and after 
performing a review of related literature, the NWC and OSD-Policy agreed upon the following four 
research questions to help address the game’s objectives.   
1. What are existing strategic and operational security, legal and diplomatic impediments to 
effective interdiction of prohibited materials during shipment and transshipment among PSI 
member states? 
2. What security, legal, and diplomatic implications are associated with interdicting, inspecting, 
detaining, seizing, off-loading, and disposing cargo on the high seas and in port? 
3. What are the strategic and operational security, legal, and diplomatic challenges as a result of 
ratification or non-ratification of the Beijing Convention? 
4. How do national laws, policies and procedures differ amongst PSI OEG member states with 
regard to disposition and liability 
IDENTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
The independent variables in this game were the 12 proliferation events encountered by country and 
functional teams (x1), and ratification of the Beijing Convention (x2). The dependent variables were 
comprised of a country or functional teams ability to effectively impede and stop WMD, their 
delivery systems, and related items (y1(a),(b),(c)) using the myriad national and international 
diplomatic, legal, military, and law enforcement capabilities at their disposal. 
DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS  
Prior to game execution, players were provided a common set of definitions to frame their discussions during 
game play. It should be noted, that not all participants defined and applied these terms in the same manner 
throughout game play. Insights related to country team approaches to these terms can be located in section 
three of the report.  
Transit: Cargo that enters and exits the territory of a country and in the process is transported from 
one port of entry to a different port of exit. 
Transshipment: Cargo that enters and exits the territory of a country and in the process is moved 
from one conveyance to another within the same port. 
The Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil 
Aviation (Beijing Convention): Succeeds the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Civil Aviation and further criminalizes the act of using civil aircraft as a 
weapon, and of using dangerous materials to attack aircraft or other targets. 
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Critical Capabilities and Practices (CCPs): Tools and resources developed and shared among 
PSI endorsing nations for interdicting the illicit transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery 
systems, and related material to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.  
II. Game Design 
OVERVIEW OF GAME DESIGN AND MECHANICS  
 
PSI 2014 was designed as both an educational and analytic game. The educational component 
provided players with a decision-making environment that illustrated teaching points and fostered 
multinational cooperation, while the analytic component acquired information and data to assist 
decision-makers counter WMD proliferation. This game was designed to help players organize 
information and improve their understanding of PSI, explain how and why events unfold, and 
identify new ideas through discovery learning.  
PSI 2014 was designed as a two-move, one-sided, professionally-facilitated seminar style event 
played over two days. Participants examined two scenarios consisting of three proliferation events 
each as both country teams and functional groups. Functional groups were divided into the 
following areas of player expertise: customs and law enforcement, military, legal, and diplomatic. 
Both country teams and functional groups had the option of playing 6 proliferation events over the 
course of two days, but time constraints forced many country teams to only focus on two of them. 
The country teams from clusters A and B examined proliferation streams 1, 2, and 3 on day 1, and 
proliferation streams 7, 8, and 9 on day 2. The country teams from clusters C and D examined 
proliferation events 4, 5, and 6 on day 1, and proliferation events 10, 11, 12 on day 2.  Each scenario 
contained information on a network of people, material, finance, and transportation that drove 
players to explore issues related to the objectives for that day.   To best meet the objectives of the 
game, the proliferation scenarios the players faced got more complex as the TTX progressed. On 
both days there were maritime and air proliferation events occurring.  
On day 1, there were two UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) in play identifying the target 
countries as “countries of proliferation concern” and detailing a number of restrictions and actions 
in a multi-national effort to halt their illicit WMD and ballistic missile related activity. On day 2, the 
target countries changed, there were no UNSCRs in play, and the Beijing Convention had been 
ratified and considered “in-force” for all playing country teams.  Both countries were essentially 
emergent countries of proliferation concern. This forced the players to look to other international 
and national legal frameworks outside of UNSCRs as a basis for taking interdiction actions. We 
acknowledged that amongst the countries participating there were likely varying levels of work that 
had been completed towards ratification and the development of national implementing legislation 
as regards the Beijing Convention.  For some players, “projecting ahead” was a small step and for 
others it was going to be a larger leap. Regardless, playing with the Beijing Convention “in-force” 
required the players to think through the resultant implications before making – or not making a 
decision to take an interdiction action. 
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The flexible nature of this game design enabled players to maximize opportunities for exploration, 
learning, and interaction while simultaneously playing multiple proliferation events. Each move 
consisted of a scene setter brief, a scenario update which led to each country generating of an initial 
assessment and ultimately developing a course of action for each proliferation event within the 
scenario.   Following the COA development activity, each of the four country clusters were led in a 
moderated plenary to discuss the variations to the COAs each country developed.  In the next 
activity players were reorganized into functional teams according to their expertise within each 
country cluster to discuss key functional issues encountered while developing their COAs and what 
CCP tools were necessary to successfully prevent the proliferation events in the scenarios.  This 
activity was a primer to prepare the functional teams from each of the country clusters to come 
together in a functional plenary to allow for collaborative international discussions within each area 
of expertise.  Finally, all the players came together for a moderated group plenary discussion to 
further explore the themes that were initially derived from game play.  
On Tuesday morning, players received general briefings related to transit- transshipment, the Beijing 
Convention, and CCP Tools, as well as disposition and liability. The game staff introduced players to 
the intent and mechanics of the game, and presented a notional scenario to set the scene for 
subsequent game play. Game play was conducted Tuesday afternoon through Wednesday afternoon. 
On Thursday morning, all players participated in a combined super plenary session to discuss key 
issues and insights derived from game play. The remainder of Thursday was used for participant 
surveys, a Heads of Delegation Meeting, and breakouts on the topics of military and exercise, legal, 
customs and law enforcement and CCP tools.  
Based on that initial information, country teams were directed to complete an Initial Assessment 
Template (Annex A) to organize their thoughts and outline their initial understanding of the 
situation, possible laws and policies that could be applied during game play, and their general 
country position on the situation. Teams were provided fifteen minutes to complete the electronic 
template saved on the NWC game tool specifically designed for this game. Once the teams 
completed their Initial Assessment Template, cell facilitators provided the teams with additional 
information related to the scenario. After receiving this update, country teams completed their 
courses of action template related to the proliferation events presented in the scenario update.  In 
addition to providing high-level details of their actions, this template captured supporting rationale 
and potential issues associated with their country’s action or decision.  
 
Once players submitted their courses of action, the game entered the collaborative phase where 
country teams presented and discussed issues with their approach. Using prepared questions and 
player template responses, country teams then engaged in a facilitated plenary discussion to discuss 
important issues related to game play. This plenary allowed for country cells to discuss and 
familiarize themselves with scenarios and issues unrelated to their own. It allowed for deeper 
exploration of paths not taken – branches and sequels, and a greater understanding of why decisions 
were made. The super combined plenary session conducted on the final day of game play allowed all 
participants to further discuss and explore issues from different country and functional perspectives. 
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GAME SCENARIOS  
The following section provides an overview of the ground-truth storylines which became the basis 
for the scenarios used by each of the four country and functional cluster teams each day. Scenarios 
were developed using fictional countries and geography. For the Game, everyone played as Country 
Green but through the unique lens of their national laws, their national policies, their memberships 
in treaties and/or regimes, their capabilities, and finally, their risk calculus. For simplification, we 
coined the term GICWG which stood for the Green Interagency or Interministerial 
Counterproliferation Working Group (GICWG) and this represented whatever organizational 
structure each country had in place to deal with events like the ones we depict in our scenarios.  
 
 
Figure 1.  TTX Fictional World 
 
Introduction to Game Day One Countries of Proliferation Concern 
Country Granite  
Granite is widely viewed as a country of proliferation concern and many believe their declared civil 
uranium enrichment program is a cover for an effort to secretly build nuclear weapons. Granite’s 
response has been to stonewall and deceive the IAEA and be largely uncooperative. UNSCR 2904 
was adopted in May 2013 to address these concerns. In contravention, Granite continues to enrich 
uranium for “peaceful purposes” and maintains an active research and development program. They 
have over the years developed a sophisticated global procurement program that manages to be 
moderately successful in bypassing sanctions, trade restrictions and other international efforts to 
encourage their compliance with UN and IAEA requests. Granite has been openly defiant of the 
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international community’s efforts to limit its illicit programs and has directed hostile rhetoric toward 
countries that supported the UNSCR, including Green. Granite has limited economic and cultural 
connections with Green that fluctuate with the political relationship.  
Granite’s program to develop an indigenous ballistic missile production capability over the past 
decade has been met with moderate success. They have produced a relatively large number of both 
solid fueled and liquid fueled short and medium range ballistic missiles (SRBM/MRBM) that have 
proven to be somewhat unreliable and woefully inaccurate for their needs. To remediate these 
deficiencies, Granite has recently begun looking to outside sources for components that will increase 
both the reliability and accuracy of their SRBM/MRBM ballistic missile forces. According to 
sensitive intelligence, Granite is specifically looking for advanced gyroscopes, radiation hardened 
micro-circuits and military grade analog to digital convertors. They may also be looking to procure 
solid fuel rocket engines for their prototype intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM).  
 
Since being designated a country of proliferation concern, Granite has denied interdicted cargoes 
were destined for WMD end-uses, asserting legitimate industrial applications for dual-use 
commodities. Merchant vessels operated by Granite’s state shipping company have exhibited mixed 
cooperation—at times responding with hostility—toward countries attempting to examine 
shipments of possible proliferation concern. In response to previous cargo seizures, Granite’s 
procurement network has adopted increasingly complex logistics practices, including using routes 
that minimize or exclude transshipment and shipping with Granite’s national carrier, suggesting 
future interdiction opportunities may be scant. Granite’s response to previous interdiction efforts 
has been largely rhetorical, including threatening (but not carrying out) military action. Four years of 
international sanctions and general economic mismanagement have diminished Granite’s ability to 
respond using economic levers, and Granite’s diminished international clout/position also leaves 
few diplomatic options. Granite has the capacity to respond regionally through a range of military 
activities, ranging from limited conventional military anti-access and area-denial actions to ballistic 
missile / asymmetric operations aimed at interfering with the regional commercial and military 
activities of those who attempt to enforce the UNSCR, including Green.  
 
Country Quartz  
Quartz is a declared nuclear power and widely viewed as a country of proliferation concern. After 
conducting nuclear tests in 2010 and 2011, Quartz announced in 2012 that it had developed a 
nuclear weapon. Green intelligence assessments are in general agreement that Quartz possesses a 
small stockpile of relatively simple nuclear weapons. They also assess that Quartz has a large 
chemical weapons capability. Since 2010, Quartz is no longer a party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. UNSCR 2846 was adopted in June 2012 to address these concerns. In 
contravention, Quartz continues to enrich uranium and manufacture plutonium, and it maintains an 
active nuclear weapons research and development program. They have over the years developed a 
relatively unsophisticated global procurement program that manages to be minimally successful in 
bypassing sanctions, trade restrictions and other international efforts to encourage their compliance 
with UN and IAEA requests. Quartz has been openly defiant of the international community’s 
efforts to limit its illicit programs and has directed hostile rhetoric toward countries that supported 
the UNSCR, including Green. Quartz has limited economic and cultural connections with Green 
that fluctuate with the political relationship.  
 
Quartz is seeking to improve and expand its nuclear weapons capabilities, in particular its 
production of fissile material. It has recently begun exporting ballistic missile related materials and 
components in order to generate revenue to import fissile material processing related equipment.  
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Since the announcement of the UNSCR against Quartz’s WMD program and related procurement 
efforts, Quartz has exhibited a heightened posture of hostility toward those who attempt to enforce 
it, including Green. Merchant vessels operated by Quartz’s national fleet act in a belligerent fashion 
with the threat of retaliatory violence toward countries attempting to examine shipments of possible 
proliferation concern. However, Quartz has responded semi-positively to diplomatic outreach by 
third countries with relatively close relationships to Quartz, though such outreach is infrequent and 
rarely effective. In response to previous cargo seizures, procurement and supplier networks for 
Quartz have probably resorted to operating under further anonymity through using foreign 
intermodal shipping services vice Quartz’s national carrier. Such measures include shipping from 
Quartz ports to major regional hub ports aboard Quartz-operated feeder services and transferring 
falsely declared cargoes to other foreign carriers for delivery to the ultimate end users. Future 
interdiction options may be more ample, but detection becomes more of a challenge.  
 
Quartz typically seeks external support to lobby in favor of Quartz’s own interests, but largely does 
not publically acknowledge any interdictions and would not be expected to threaten military action. 
International sanctions, domestic economic policies, and broader political corruption have crippled 
Quartz’s economy, thus diminishing their ability to respond using economic levers. Additionally, 
Quartz has diplomatically alienated itself over years of internationally-defiant activity and has 
virtually no viable diplomatic options. Quartz has very limited capacity to strike far from its borders 
with its conventional military forces, but could threaten regional allies of GREEN. Quartz could 
also threaten further nuclear testing and use rhetoric to indicate its ability to strike at some distance 
with its ballistic missile force if Green or others continue to interfere in its military technology 
agreements with its customers. 
 
Proliferation Event 1: Quartz attempt to obtain aluminum 7075  
The Nuclear Development Program Office (NDPO) in Country QUARTZ is attempting to procure 
NSG-controlled 12.5 MT of Aluminum 7075 in order to build additional centrifuges to increase 
their capacity to enrich uranium.  Acme Manufacturing in Country GREEN legitimately agrees to 
supply 7075 Aluminum to a Broker in Country PINE who routinely provides 7075 to legitimate 
businesses in PINE. Unbeknownst to Acme Manufacturing, the Broker siphons off 12.5 MT, 
changes the specifications and arranges for transport to QUARTZ via M/V BASS ELEVENASS 
ELEVEN, a Country QUARTZ-owned, -flagged and -crewed M/V.  The voyage routing has the 
M/V PERCH THREE departing from Major Shipping port in Country GREEN with an 
intermediate stop in Country POPLAR to conduct cargo transloading operations before arrival in 
Country PINE. Upon arrival in Country PINE, the container is offloaded at Port Minor and ground 
transported to a warehouse at Port Major (both ports are in Country PINE) and subsequently re-
exported via M/V BASS ELEVENASS ELEVEN to Country QUARTZ. The complicit and witting 
Broker in Country PINE is the primary actor in carrying out this proliferation transaction. 
 
Proliferation Event 2: Granite attempt to obtain rocket engines 
The Ballistic Missile Development Organization (BMDO) in Country GRANITE is attempting to 
procure rocket engines for their indigenously produced IRBM in order to increase the maximum 
range of their ballistic missile force.  Ballistic Missile Industries Inc. in Country QUARTZ agrees to 
supply the rocket engines and arranges for transport via M/V HAMMERHEAD 7. The voyage 
routing has the M/V HAMMERHEAD 7 departing from Commercial Shipping Port, Country 
QUARTZ to Commercial Shipping Port, Country CHERRY. Enroute, the M/V will pass through 
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an area where Country GREEN, Country TEAK, and Country MAHOGANY have naval assets 
participating in multi-lateral counter-piracy activities. Country GRANITE and Country PINE have 
forces in the vicinity operating unilaterally to protect their shipping interests. After passing through 
the piracy area, M/V HAMMERHEAD 7 is expected to get bunkers at a Country GINGKO 
anchorage enroute to Country CHERRY for cargo transshipment and then aboard a TBD M/V to 
Country Granite. No front companies, no brokers, and no finance are identified. 
 
Proliferation Event 3: Granite attempt to obtain radiation hardened microcircuits 
The Ballistic Missile Development Organization (BMDO) in Country GRANITE is attempting to 
procure radiation hardened microcircuits in order to enhance the reliability of their ballistic missile 
forces. Country WALNUT-based company Walnut Electronics agrees to supply the radiation 
hardened microcircuits and arranges for transport via commercial air freight. Ace Broker Services in 
WALNUT ordered 500 radiation-hardened microcircuits from Walnut Electronics. 300 were 
shipped to an end-user in GREEN. Ace Broker services changed the specification on the remaining 
200 microcircuits to ordinary computer printer boards (uncontrolled) and shipped them to 
GRANITE via commercial air freight. The voyage routing has the regularly scheduled mixed cargo 
(PAX/FREIGHT) civil aircraft departing from Major International Airport, Country WALNUT on 
its twice weekly flight to Country GRANITE.  The aircraft conducts a technical stop in Country 
GREEN to refuel and swap crews, and then conducts a stop in Country WILLOW for cargo ops 
and PAX transfers. The aircraft overflies SPRUCE before arrival at Major International Airport, 
Country GRANITE. 
 
Proliferation Event 4: Granite attempt to obtain military-grade analog to digital converters  
The Ballistic Missile Development Organization (BMDO) in Country GRANITE is attempting to 
procure sophisticated circuit boards made with military-grade analog to digital converters to enhance 
the accuracy and reliability of their ballistic missiles.  Proud Maple Manufacturers Inc. located in 
MAPLE agrees to supply the items to Granite Civilian Aviation Agency (GCAA) which it produces 
partly from component parts it has imported from a manufacturer located in Country OAK.  
The military-grade analog to digital converters received from Oak Electronics in Country OAK are 
controlled items that were exported under license to Proud Maple Manufacturers. Proud Maple Mfg. 
Inc. and the Maple Shipping Company do not believe a requirement exists for them to obtain a re-
export license from Country OAK prior to sending the analog to digital converters to Country 
GRANITE.  
Country OAK believes that MAPLE does indeed require a (re-export) license from them and, 
moreover, Country OAK believes that the percentage of OAK-origin materials in the sophisticated 
circuit boards means that an existing UNSCR prohibits the delivery of these items to Country 
GRANITE.  The voyage routing has the suspect container being loaded on M/V MAKO 3 in 
commercial shipping port Country MAPLE. M/V MAKO 3 stops in Country GREEN and then 
Country ASH where the container is to be transferred to another (TBD but likely GRANITE 
owned/flagged) M/V for transport to Country GRANITE Broker Silk in Granite acting on behalf 
of BMDO assists in the transaction by brokering the deal between Proud Maple Manufacturing and 
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Granite CAA (actually on behalf of BMDO; Granite Civil Aviation not listed in UNSCR, BMDO is 
listed) 
Proliferation Event 5: Country Ebony attempt to obtain rocket fuel oxidizer  
The Ballistic Missile Forces Organization (BMFO) in Country EBONY is attempting to procure 
rocket fuel oxidizer as a source of fuel for their ballistic missile forces. Ballistic Missile Industries in 
Country QUARTZ agrees to supply the rocket fuel oxidizer and arranges for transport via M/V 
BASS TWELVE – a Country QUARTZ-owned, Country PECAN-flagged M/V loaded with other 
general cargo destined for Country EBONY. The voyage routing has the conveyance departing from 
Port Major in Country QUARTZ and includes a stop in Country ELM territorial waters for 
bunkering before arrival at Port Major in Country EBONY.  There are no front companies or 
brokers involved and the funds are transferred between National Banks in Country EBONY Capital 
and Country QUARTZ Capital.  
Proliferation Event 6: Granite attempt to obtain advanced gyroscopes 
The Ballistic Missile Development Organization (BMDO) in Country GRANITE is attempting to 
procure Advanced Gyroscopes to enhance the accuracy of their Ballistic Missile Force. Advanced 
Systems Incorporated (ASI) in Country GREEN agrees to supply the Gyroscopes to a non-existent 
end-user through a witting broker in Country GREEN. The broker changes the specifications, 
falsifies documents and arranges for transport to BMDO via commercial air freight. The voyage 
routing has a TEAK aircraft departing from Major International Airport in Country GREEN to 
Major International Airport Country GRANITE, overflying Country WILLOW, and conducting an 
intermediate stop for PAX transload in Country SPRUCE. A front company and broker in Country 
GREEN both assist in the transaction. 
Introduction to Game Day Two Countries of Proliferation Interest/Concern 
Country Flint 
Flint was not previously viewed as a country of proliferation concern. They have procured a 
substantial short-range conventional ballistic force over the past decade and are considered 
moderately proficient as evidenced by their testing & exercising regimes. Until recently, they have 
had no identified WMD program. 
While Flint has its fair share of internal disputes and discontent, they are generally considered stable. 
There is however a long-simmering regional dispute that has over the past few years elevated in its 
intensity. The UN Secretary General has issued a number of statements calling for all parties to work 
towards peaceful resolution of the regional disputes which include aspects of territory, economic 
and security. 
Flint’s relationship with Green is not characterized by either close political ties or open 
political/diplomatic hostility. Key points to the relationship include commercial trade, low-level 
military and cultural exchanges and events and even some limited sales of military equipment. 
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Recent intelligence acquired by Green suggests a regime desire for a chemical weapons capability to 
address what Flint perceives as a growing conventional imbalance with a regional antagonist and to 
serve as a deterrent against adventurism. Flint is assessed to have an on-going secretive program to 
develop, procure and import materials and equipment necessary to develop an offensive CW 
capability, and likely relies on their national shipping companies as well as foreign shipping lines to 
deliver CW-applicable materials that is cannot produce or develop indigenously. Some Green 
analysts believe the procurement effort is more mature than originally predicted and may indeed be 
close to break-out. 
According to sensitive intelligence, Flint has recently begun looking to outside sources for what may 
be the final components necessary to achieve a limited CW production capability. Flint is specifically 
looking for corrosion resistant valves (CRV), Hydrogen Fluoride and Kynar Piping. Flint, if aware of 
interdiction activity, would likely respond with denial, asserting industrial applications for WMD-
applicable commodities, and would likely protest through diplomatic channels and threaten 
opposition to Green political initiatives in international bodies. Flint procurement networks would 
likely respond to interdictions by adopting delivery mechanisms perceived to offer more security. 
Country Shale 
Shale is a country of proliferation concern and has a substantial ballistic missile program and a large 
chemical weapons program (gravity bombs, rockets, artillery, and other sub-BM delivery systems). 
Embroiled in sectarian violence Shale is in the midst of declining into civil war. The UNSC is 
monitoring the situation closely and has issued a number of resolutions calling for a peaceful 
resolution of the internal security situation but none are specifically focused on their WMD program 
and related proliferation concerns. 
Recent intelligence acquired by Green suggests a regime desire for a chemical weapons capability to 
address what Shale perceives as shortcomings in their conventional ability to deter anti-regime forces 
from further sectarian violence. Specifically, Shale desires to develop a ballistic missile warhead 
capable of delivering a chemical weapon payload. Some Green analysts believe the Shale 
development effort has hit a significant roadblock and that Shale lacks the technical expertise to 
overcome this challenge. 
According to sensitive intelligence, Shale has recently begun looking to outside sources for this 
technical expertise. They also are attempting to procure and import glass-lined reactor vessels 
(GLRV) and a gas monitoring system (GMS) to facilitate their ballistic missile chemical warhead 
research and development effort. The Shale military has an established relationship with Shale 
Research University (SRU) and periodically has used the University as a front for the procurement 
of controlled or particularly sensitive materials. 
Shale has a moderately confrontational relationship with Green which occasionally includes openly 
hostile rhetoric and opposition to Green political initiatives in international bodies. Shale has limited 
economic and cultural connections with Green that fluctuate with the political relationship. 
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Any discernible response to interdictions by Shale would likely be limited to changes in practices by 
procurement networks, including the adoption of delivery methods perceived to offer more security 
and increased communications security. In contrast to Granite, Quartz and Flint, Shale has no 
national merchant fleet and must, in addition to their national air cargo service, rely on an array of 
foreign shipping lines for delivery of WMD-related procurements. 
Proliferation Event 7: Country Flint attempt to obtain Hydrogen Fluoride 
The newly established (and highly secretive) Flint Chemical Weapons Directorate (FCWD) in 
Country FLINT seeks a number of Items including Hydrogen Fluoride (HF). They have established 
a solid relationship with FLINT’s Tangerine Industrial Cleaning Products (TICP) which now 
operates as a front for FCWD, procuring, receiving and storing the items necessary for breakout of a 
CW production capability. As a member of the CWC, FLINT is going to great lengths to keep this 
program hidden. The Hydrogen Fluoride is containerized and shipped aboard M/V TROUT SEVEN from 
Country PINE to GREEN where the container is transshipped to the M/V SALMON NINE for delivery to 
FLINT. Upon arrival in FLINT, the container will be trucked to a warehouse owned and operated by TICP. 
 
Proliferation Event 8: Country Shale attempt to obtain technical assistance 
 
The Ballistic Missile Development Organization (BMDO) in Country SHALE is attempting to 
procure the services of an experienced chemical engineer in order to further research and 
development efforts associated with their Chemical WMD effort.  A chemical engineer with ties to 
Country ASH’s (former) chemical weapons program agrees to provide the desired services and 
boards a flight originating out of Country ASH to Country SHALE through Green on regularly 
scheduled ASH and SHALE Civil Airlines flights. The first leg is on an ASH flagged and operated 
civil airline regularly scheduled flight. The route includes a stop in GREEN at which the engineer 
will transfer to a SHALE flagged and operated civil aircraft bound for SHALE.  The chemical 
engineer has, in his (carry-on) possession, a laptop containing classified plans for developing 
chemical warheads for Ballistic Missile employment. He has also checked 2 bags. 
 
Proliferation Event 9: Country Flint attempt to obtain Kynar piping 
The newly established (and highly secretive) Flint Chemical Weapons Directorate (FCWD) in 
Country FLINT seeks a number of Items including Kynar piping. They have established a solid 
relationship with FLINT’s Tangerine Industrial Cleaning Products (TICP) which now operates as a 
front for FCWD, procuring, receiving and storing the items necessary for breakout of a CW 
production capability. As a member of the CWC, FLINT is going to great lengths to keep this 
program hidden. Country ASH is one of a few producers of Kynar piping suited for Flint’s 
requirements. Unwittingly, a company in ASH ships the Kynar piping via M/V SHARK 2 to TICP. 
The multi-modal route includes a stop in GREEN’S FTZ where it is repackaged into air cargo 
containers and then delivered via ground freight to GREEN’s North Airport for transfer to FLINT 
Air for ultimate delivery via air freight to TICP. 
Proliferation Event 10: Country Shale attempt to obtain Glass Lined Reactor Vessels 
A Research University in Country SHALE places an order for Glass Lined Reactor Vessels (GLRV) 
from Science and Tech Company (STC) in Country WALNUT.  STC believes that the GLRVs were 
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bound for SHALE Research University for legitimate purposes and arranges transport via 
WALNUT AIR CARGO (WAC). The voyage routing has the WAC aircraft departing Large 
International Airport in Country WALNUT overflying both Country PECAN and Country 
REDWOOD enroute Large International Airport, Country SHALE. The Research University in 
Country SHALE acts as a front-company for the SHALE BMDO and is a pass through for the 
transaction. 
Proliferation Event 11: Country Flint attempt to obtain Corrosion Resistant Valves 
Tangerine Industrial Cleaning Products in Country FLINT is a front company established by the 
Defense Department to procure and import the necessary equipment and materials for the CW 
program. Advanced Machining Inc. in Country PINE agrees to supply the corrosion-resistant valves 
to Tangerine Industrial Cleaning Products(ICP), a licensed and legitimate end user. TICP arranges 
transport via commercial air freight. The voyage routing has the regularly scheduled aircraft 
departing Major International Airport, Country PINE overflying GREEN before landing at Major 
International Airport Country FLINT. The aircraft likely has the fuel to return to Pine, but not to 
divert around Green and arrive safely in Flint.  
Proliferation Event 12: Country Shale attempt to obtain a Gas Monitoring System 
The Shale Ballistic Missile Development Organization (BMDO) is attempting to procure a gas 
monitoring system. Toxicology Associates in Country ASH agrees to supply the gas monitoring 
system and arranges transport via commercial air freight. The voyage routing normally has the 
regularly scheduled aircraft departing Major International Airport, Country ASH, landing in Country 
Green. The article is transported via truck to a secondary airport for cargo pickup on a SHALE-
flagged civil cargo aircraft. Toxicology Associates ships globally and works closely with ASH-based 
Premier Broker Services (PBS) for global sales. PBS is a front company in the transaction 
OVERARCHING METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTIC FRAMING 
As an applied research and evaluation project, the game design for PSI 2014 focused on generating 
new knowledge to identify and develop a shared understanding of the critical challenges and 
opportunities in counter-proliferation interdiction. Consistent with Cherry Holmes (1992) and 
Morgan (2007), pragmatism provides a philosophical basis for this study. This approach is interested 
in identifying the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of potential solutions to real world problems (Patton, 1990), 
understanding different expert opinions (Creswell, 2009), and using different forms of data 
collection and analysis to corroborate results (Merriam, 2009). 
A qualitative methods design was used to answer the four central research questions. Common in 
qualitative research, this study uses triangulation through two or more different data collection and 
analysis methods to integrate and confirm findings (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010).  This approach 
commonly employs distinct quantitative and qualitative methods as a means to strengthen the use of 
one method with the weaknesses of another.  Much of the strength of this approach comes with 
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being able to draw the same or similar conclusions using different datasets and methods (Creswell, 
2009).  
Two forms of data analysis were conducted to describe the qualitative and quantitative data collected 
in the study. Qualitative data collected from country and cluster templates, ethnographic notes, and 
open-ended survey responses relied on content analysis and grounded theory to discern underlying 
patterns and themes in the data. Selective, in-vivo, and serendipitous coding were conducted on 
these data using the ATLAS.ti software application. Using the co-occurrence function within the 
software allowed the game analysts to determine the correlation between terms.   Descriptive 
analysis of quantitative data was used to describe the nominal and ordinal measures derived from the 
end-of-game individual player questionnaire.  Statistical analyses of these questions were conducted 
using the Analysis ToolPak functions in Microsoft Excel 2010. Qualitative and quantitative data 
were analyzed concurrently and then integrated in the interpretation of the overall results. 
PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS 
U.S. and international participants from PSI member states were sought that work PSI in the areas 
of diplomacy, legal, customs and law enforcement, and military. No other criteria were enforced for 
PSI participant sampling. The subsequent demographic statistics were compiled from self-reported 
responses garnered from the online registration site and the individual player questionnaire 
administered at the end of the game.  The 70 players who contributed demographic data consisted 
primarily of mid to senior-level military and civilian officials from 17 PSI OEG countries.  45 of the 
70 players responded to the end of game questionnaire. This data was used to gain a better 
understanding of player experience with PSI and PSI related exercises.  Each country and functional 
area of expertise was adequately represented during the game.   Even though 50 percent of players 
reported to have less than one year of PSI experience and 51 percent of players reported no prior 
experience in PSI table top exercises, both the quality and quantity of players represented at the 
game generated relevant data to help answer the sponsor’s research questions.  Figures 1 through 4 
depict the number of participants by country and functional expertise, as well as the percentage of 
participants with experience in PSI and exercises related to PSI. 
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Figure 2. Number of Participants by Country    
 
Figure 3. Total Number of Participants by Functional Expertise    
  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Diplomatic Military Customs/Law
Enforcement
Legal Other
 
 
15 
 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of Participants with PSI Experience  
 
 
Figure 5. Percentage of Participants with PSI Exercise Experience 
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III. Analysis and Findings 
OVERVIEW 
PSI 14 tabletop exercise players successfully adapted their thinking while leveraging their experiences 
to identify and share capacity building tools with the broader PSI community. Players were charged 
with developing specific courses of action as both country teams and multinational functional 
groups to counter the 12 unique proliferation events provided in the game. During these activities, 
players discussed the various challenges in identifying, interdicting, and seizing proliferation items 
that travel via air and sea.  
From the cell discussions and products identified as cell deliverables, the game analysts were able to 
conduct analysis on key co-occurring terms identified through ATLAS.ti. The game analysts used 
player derived observations and themes generated during gameplay and these co-occurrences to 
determine three distinct areas seen as important to the future of PSI. Players were also given an end 
of game individual survey to assess their understanding of international standards, national laws, 
policies, and terminology related to air interdiction, transit/transshipment, and liability and 
disposition as well as to identify the need to improve existing CCP tools or to create new CCP tools 
for the above topics.  The response choices were based on a five-point Likert-scale (agree, 
somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or disagree).  45 of the 70 players 
responded to the end of game questionnaire, which yields a 64 percent response rate.  The 
subsequent sections, describe specific country and functional team results, summary of player 
derived themes, and limitation of game analysis.  
REVIEW OF KEY CELL DELIVERABLES     
In order to better understand the challenges and solutions associated with identifying, interdicting, 
and seizing WMD related material, each of the seventeen country teams developed a specific course 
of action to address one of three proliferation streams assigned to them. During this activity, players 
assumed the perspective of their country in their discussion of key diplomatic, legal, military, and law 
enforcement actions that are needed to stop trafficking of WMD, their delivery systems, and related 
materials to and from the fictional states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.  
In an effort to uphold the non-attribution environment generated during game play, this section of 
the report will refer to each country as ‘country teams’. Country team data is described in the 
following six categories under this section: interdiction actions; international coordination and 
cooperation; Course of Action rationale; impediments to executing Course of Action; compensation, 
ownership, and possession. Some country teams were not able to respond to questions related to 
compensation, ownership, and possession. 
Similarly, comments from specific countries that participated in the multinational functional teams 
will not be attributed as well. Functional team data is broken out into separate legal, diplomatic, law 
enforcement, and military sections and looks across proliferation streams 7-12 from day two of the 
game. This data is summarized after the summary of country data at the end of this section.    
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Country Team Results  
 
Proliferation Event 1: Quartz attempt to obtain aluminum 7075  
 
Interdiction Actions 
  
One country team determined that it was not legally in a position to interdict the shipment in 
question as it left its jurisdiction and was now in the jurisdiction of Poplar. However, to prevent 
further shipments of aluminum 7075 going to Pine, Green would cancel the export license and work 
with the exporting company to prevent future situations. Over the long-term, Green would reach 
out to Pine to explain Green's decision to prevent exports, and to understand their domestic 
processes for complying with international law.  
 
Another country team noted that they would withdraw the license to export aluminum based on 
information that aluminum bound for Pine has been shipped to Quartz and the end-user. They 
would first request the government of Poplar to consider stopping the shipment and unloading the 
container containing the aluminum. They would also request the government of Cedar (flag state) to 
keep the container on board the ship and unload when the ship is back in Green. Country Green 
would request the government of Spruce to consider keeping the container on board the ship and 
unload the container containing the aluminum. Finally, they would request the government of Pine 
to hold back the shipment based on their international obligations in order for the end-user not to 
get their hands on the aluminum.  
 
International Coordination and Cooperation  
 
One country team suggested that they would consult with Birch on sharing the intelligence provided 
about the shipment with Poplar. In consultation with Birch, Green (Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade and Domestic Customs and Border Protection Service) would reach out to Poplar and 
inform their relevant authorities of the situation (i.e. that a shipment of aluminum 7075 is in the 
process of being shipped with export license to Pine and that the shipment is currently in port in 
Poplar). 
 
Green would request that Poplar unload and inspect the relevant container. Pending the outcome of 
the inspection, if the container contains aluminum 7075, Poplar would seize the material. Poplar has 
authority and obligation to prevent the transfer of prohibited materials under UNSCR 2846 to 
Green and would draw Poplar's attention to this. If Poplar refuses cooperation, then Green would 
repeat the above process with Pine (assuming that the ship has left Poplar and has anchored in 
Pine). If Pine refuses cooperation, Green would also investigate options for interdiction at sea 
(either between Poplar and Pine or between Pine and Quartz), including by informing the UNSC 
and asking member states to use their assets to interdict the MV Perch on the high seas.    
 
Conversely, another country suggested that as Green, they would also request Gingko to inspect the 
ship when it arrives at its port in accordance in accordance with UNSCR 2846. However, there is the 
risk of Gingko failing to comply with UNSCR because of the lack of the national legislation.  They 
would also share intelligence with Poplar and Pine in accordance with bilateral relations. Green 
would also contact Birch regarding the ownership on the information in question (e.g., what 
intelligence may be distributed to relevant governments?).    
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Course of Action Rationale  
 
The Export Control Act and regulations, UNSCRs, PSI and SUA protocol 5 all provide a strong 
rationale for interdiction. The policy and diplomatic rationale behind Green's proposed course of 
action is to preserve and maintain bilateral relations with the countries in question (particularly Birch 
and Poplar).  Similarly, Green is likely to have the greatest chance of a positive resolution to the 
situation by relying on bilateral relationship with Birch and Poplar. Green is obliged to act to prevent 
the shipment reaching Quartz under UNSCR 2846. The legal rationale for Green's proposed course 
of action is that the shipment is currently in Poplar, and Green has no authority in a foreign 
sovereign nation.  Green considers that relying on the obligations that UNSCR 2846 also places on 
Poplar and Pine to be a strong legal basis to encourage their support in preventing Quartz from 
obtaining aluminum 7075. Operationally, the above course of action is the most practical as Green 
does not have sufficient assets to ensure an effective interdiction on the high seas - cooperation with 
countries that are best placed to operationally assist will be crucial.   
 
Impediments to Executing Course of Action  
 
Restrictions manifest throughout both country teams’ proposed course of action. Policy and 
diplomatic impediments include sharing of intelligence provided by allies and maintaining bilateral 
relationships. Governments must have the political will to implement international obligations. Legal 
issues include a lack of jurisdiction and obligation to act to prevent transfer of controlled materials. 
While UNSCRs provide a legal basis to interdict on the high seas, Green would still need to ensure 
the basis for believing the shipment contained aluminum 7075 was reasonable. From an operational 
perspective, Green suggested that it would be difficult to search and seize containerized goods at sea 
(or in another country's port) and interdict ships on the high seas given Green's naval assets and 
positioning and time constraints. Once materials are within Quartz jurisdiction either in the country 
or on a national shipping line or vessel flagged to Quartz, it would be operationally difficult to regain 
the materials (and legally difficult).   
 
Proliferation Event 2: Granite attempt to obtain rocket engines 
 
Interdiction Actions 
  
A country team suggested that they would first determine the flag state of the vessel and then 
contact the country of Cedar with this information.  They would also conduct a fly-over to confirm 
the flag of the ship and get imagery of cargo to be used in the demarche (unclassified information to 
confirmed intelligence).  Next, if the registry is Cedar, they would ask for flag state consent to board 
and inspect cargo. If the registry is of a hostile country and if there is suspicion that the vessel is 
flying the Quartz flag, but is registered with Cedar, then reasonable grounds exists for ‘statelessness’, 
and country Green will board the ship.   Similarly, another country team suggested that they will 
inspect the ship from Quartz with the consent of the flag country of Cedar before it arrives in 
Cherry. Maximum caution would be taken because the ship’s captain is a Quartz national. If this 
approach fails, Green will retry the inspection seeking the consent from the new flag country. Green 
will request the assistance from other participating countries in Counter-Piracy. 
 
Another country team selected to engage internationally to assess a COA, optimize information and 
intelligence collection and analysis, and verify the status and availability of domestic and 
international assets to interdict. This country team also identified the need to establish an agreed 
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COA to manage risk and integrate the communications networks required to command and control 
multinational forces in this effort.  The final country team that confronted this proliferation event 
elected to leverage the piracy-operation mandate as a legal basis to inhibit the shipment. The 
country’s Ministry of Justice will notify relevant governments about a potential boarding operation 
and will coordinate on the decision to act and agree upon the most suitable actions to undertake 
under a multinational operational framework.   
 
International Coordination and Cooperation  
 
As previously noted, several countries opted to request for flag state consent from Cedar to conduct 
an inspection.  If a shipboarding agreement with Cedar was in position, country Green would 
request boarding authority under that agreement. If illicit cargo is confirmed, they could possibly 
request assistance to divert the ship into Cedar.   In addition, when the ship stops to refuel in 
Gingko, country Green would request search and inspection assistance from Gingko. Similarly, 
another country team suggested that they would also request Gingko to inspect the ship when it 
arrives at its port in accordance with UNSCR 2846. However, country Green runs the risk of the 
country of Gingko failing to comply with UNSCR because of the lack of the national legislation. 
Another country team also said they would engage with Gingko to examine the 6 FTE's in question 
during bunkering stop over. Close coordination with engaged states, and engaging the United 
Nations regarding the potential breach of UNSCR 2904 and IMO boarding vessel in an international 
passage would have to occur. Country Green would also support and engage states to develop an 
ad-hoc multinational Task Force to interdict vessels at sea.  
 
Course of Action Rationale  
 
One country noted that the decision to act quickly is crucial. “There is only a certain amount of time 
before the ship will arrive in port, and in an effort to stop movement of goods.” The legal basis 
would be the Law of the Sea principles, enforcement of UNSCRs and statelessness. Specifically, 
UNSCR 2846 and 2904, and Green national laws (Cargo Inspection Act, Foreign Trade Act) was 
particularly noted as way to prevent the ship from arriving in the country of Cherry.   
 
Impediments to Executing Course of Action  
 
The captain who is a national of Quartz might resist to the inspection despite the consent of the flag 
country. Similarly, limited intelligence owned by Green makes it difficult to share sensitive 
information with Cherry because of their adversarial relationship with Green. Another impediment 
would be the unwillingness of nearby countries to assist Green in executing their course of action.  
While Green domestic laws provide the ability to stop proliferation of illicit materials, such authority 
does not generally reach ships on the high seas. Operationally, any diversion of this suspect cargo 
would be limited by the laws and political will of the country allowing the ship into port. Country 
Green faces capability and capacity limitations to obtain surveillance and interdict along the high 
seas.  
 
Proliferation Event 3: Granite attempt to obtain radiation hardened microcircuits 
 
Interdiction Actions 
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Green, as a transit country, has the authority to control the delivery of these items under Article 6 
European Union Regulation #428/09. After the cargo plane has landed in Green, the items have to 
be unloaded by Green's national customs administration for further inspection. Then items will be 
seized due to reasonable grounds for military end-use.   The plane can then continue its flight as 
scheduled (no indications of involvement of the airline or its personnel in proliferation activities).  In 
order to retain the plane and inspect the cargo, the additional information provided by Birch and 
other correlated evidences should constitute a solid base for a judicial order.   Once the judicial 
order is issued, the inspection would be carried out by a joint law enforcement team led by Green’s 
Aviation Customs Office. Once the airplane arrives in its territory, Green would have international 
obligations and broad Customs border search authorities to inspect the cargo, detain any 
merchandise and seize goods in violation of Green laws (either cargo or passenger baggage). If for 
some reason that Green was not in a position to inspect the cargo, it would enlist the help of Willow 
to inspect the goods when the airplane arrives in its territory.  Green would then request redelivery 
of the goods. 
 
International Coordination and Cooperation 
After consultation with Birch, Walnut and Willow will be informed and asked about further 
information of this delivery. Once the situation is clear, Green will inform the MTCR/WA about 
the incident.  The United Nations Security Council will also be informed. Country Birch may be 
asked to provide information about the shipment that would provide enough evidence for offensive 
operations. Walnut would be asked for custom information and documentation of the shipment 
(Bilateral Agreement) and export license documents (including payment information related with 
Green country). Green may submit a request to Walnut to inspect the merchandise and seek 
redelivery of the illicit cargo.  Green would utilize information sharing agreements to obtain further 
information on the illicit cargo and actors.   
 
Course of Action Rationale  
 
Since the plane is landing in Green and will stay there substantially longer than in Willow (e.g., 
refueling, swapping crew etc.) there is a better window of opportunity to act. Furthermore, it is 
unknown whether Willow authorities will act as effectively because its export control and 
interdiction mechanisms, as well as its interagency process are still evolving. This requires significant 
information and evidence which would only further delay action. Green would act with international 
partners to avoid illicit traffic of control goods with a sanctioned country. Given the shortage of 
time, the operational rational should be based on the inconsistency of documentations by end user-
broker.  
 
Impediments to Executing Course of Action  
 
Green could experience possible accusations of restricting the freedom of air transit and free trade 
resulting in legal actions.  Green would require a judicial mandate to physically inspect the shipment. 
From an operational perspective interagency coordination and communication issues will likely exist 
between Custom officials and Law Enforcement officials.   
 
Compensation, Ownership, and Possession 
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The question of any possible compensation has to be verified and determined by agencies involved. 
Green could also be sued by the exporter if it does not pursue the proper litigation processes 
involved with seizing the cargo of concern. Generally, customs officers are immune from liability for 
acts within the scope of their duties in inspecting and detaining merchandise.  However, there are 
ways to compensate parties for delay or damages administratively. Another country team suggested 
that the state would be the civil subsidiary ultimate responsible.   
 
The exporter would still maintain ownership of the cargo. Determining the true buyer of the 
merchandise would depend on a review of the shipping documents.  While Green may have 
detained the merchandise, title to the merchandise has not changed at this point.  Costs of the 
detention are borne by the importer or carrier under Green law. Once the merchandise is seized and 
forfeited, title would change to Green at that point. Another country team suggested that the 
shipment will be stored in an airport warehouse at judicial authority disposal. 
All three country teams suggested that their respective customs law enforcement agencies would 
take initial possession of the goods pursuant to broad customs authority. In some cases, a judge 
would review the facts of the case and assign the responsibility of the case to a particular law 
enforcement agency. Several country teams also suggested that specific domestic and international 
laws allows them to seize the goods and then disposed of in a number of appropriate ways.  The 
merchandise could also be abandoned. In one case, the shipment would remain in the airport cargo 
zone under the responsibility of judicial authorities.  
Proliferation Event 4: Granite attempt to obtain military-grade analog to digital converters  
Interdiction Actions 
  
One country team suggested that they would leverage their customs, port authorities, and technical 
experts to immediately develop and execute a plan to interdict the shipment at Port Green.  
Similarly, another country team also said they would detain the ship, examine the cargo under the 
Customs Act, and seize the cargo if it was determined that they were prohibited by UNSCRs. 
Coordinating an urgent interagency collaboration meeting was common across all country teams. 
The final country team suggested that their Customs Office would unload the suspect container to 
the port and inspect it, while Coast Guard vessels are positioned outside the port to interdict the 
suspect M/V Mako 3 in case it attempts to flee. Coconut and Maple will get informed of the 
interdiction through a diplomatic channel and report it to UN.  
International Coordination and Cooperation 
Green would request information-such as export license, technical specifications-from Oak and 
Maple and seek advice from UN Panel of Experts. To minimize Granite's opposition and secure 
expertise in inspection and identification, an international investigation led by a UN Experts Panel 
team would be desirable. Any information concerning this shipment and the outcome of 
investigations would be provided to Maple and Oak.  
 
Course of Action Rationale  
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There is reason able cause to suspect an offence was committed under domestic laws and 
implementing UNSCR 2904. These items are controlled on SGCA control-list end-use. Green 
would prefer to inspect the shipment in instead of inspection in the territorial waters or high seas. 
Interdiction in the High Seas would require SUA with Coconut.  Since Ash regularly rejects requests 
for cooperation on interdiction cases, Ash is less likely to cooperate on interdiction. The suspect 
container is due for transloading, which makes it easier to unload the suspect container in the 
process of this planned transloading.  
 
Impediments to Executing Course of Action  
 
Maple may not agree with Green’s assessment which could create liability issues. Granite's potential 
provocations after interdicting the shipment and bringing it into port would also impede Green’s 
efforts.  
 
Compensation, Ownership, and Possession  
 
Since there is reasonable cause for action, the government would not be liable for damages due to 
actions taken in good faith. Based on the Customs Act and decisions made at the Interagency 
Coordination Meeting, the Customs Office would likely be responsible for compensation. 
Ownership remains with the commercial entities involved, per their terms of transaction. 
Conversely, another country team suggested that based on the Customs Act and decisions made at 
the Interagency Coordination Meeting, the Customs Office would also be responsible for owning 
and possessing the cargo.  
 
Proliferation Event 5: Country Ebony attempt to obtain rocket fuel oxidizer  
 
Interdiction Actions 
  
Green will inspect the ship from Quartz with the consent of the flag country of Cedar before it 
arrives in Cherry. Green will approach the situation with maximum caution because the captain is 
from Quartz. If this attempt fails, Green will retry the inspection seeking the consent from the new 
flag country. Green will request the assistance from other countries participating in Counter-Piracy. 
Another country team said they would approach Elm, arguing that they have an obligation to 
interdict the shipment under UNSCR 2846, and also have a commitment under the PSI. If Elm fails 
to interdict, Green will approach Pecan for permission to board, with reasonable belief that they 
would grant it on the basis of their agreement. Green could also request that Birch and Poplar 
request Pecan for flag state consent to board the ship, as they may have better relations with Pecan.  
Intelligence suspects the loading of Ammonium perchlorate on M/V Bass 12 from country Quartz. 
This material is listed under 4.C.4.b of the MTCR control list. Under para 4(b) of UNSCR 2846 
(2012), the exports of MTCR-related material from Quartz is not permitted and all countries are 
called upon to prevent such transfers through their territories or areas of jurisdiction. As the 
coordinating body for counter proliferation activities, Country Green’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
will consult with their National Intelligence Agency on this matter and inform the political decision 
makers. While the M/V Bass 12 will not be travelling through Green’s territory, it will pass through 
the territorial waters of Elm for refueling. Elm is a friendly country and is an endorsee of PSI 
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interdiction principles. Assuming Elm to be a UN member state, UNSCR 2846 is equally binding for 
Elm. Green will share this intelligence with Elm authorities and ask them to board M/V Bass 12 
while docked in their port for inspection. 
International Coordination and Cooperation 
Green would share the intelligence concerning the BASS 12 and the shipment to both Pecan and 
Elm, requesting that Elm conduct an inspection of the shipment, as well as alerting Elm to the 
provisions concerning not being involved in the transfer of such items. If there is flag state consent, 
then Green would direct the vessel to Poplar or Birch for inspection.  Similarly, another country 
team would encourage its intelligence service to share information with Elm, Pecan, Poplar and 
Birch. They would also encourage Poplar and especially Birch, as an OEG member, to share their 
information with Elm and Pecan. Country Green would strongly encourage Elm, Pecan, Poplar and 
Birch to take action, while Green elects to respond diplomatically to Ebony's breach of the UNSCR. 
 
If the ship has already left Elm territorial waters on its way to Ebony, it shall have to pass through 
the Exercise Area. In this case, the ship may be prevented to continue on its route to Ebony through 
the Exercise Area. As relevant Navy assets of exercising nations are already in the area, the Flag 
State of Pecan will be contacted by Green’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on an urgent basis to ask for 
boarding permission. Simultaneously, the Green’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs will, upon 
authorization from the political decision makers, contact the Navy Command to transmit all relevant 
information to the Navy for possible interdiction and boarding. The other states conducting the 
exercise (Birch, Elm and Poplar) shall also be informed of the situation and may be invited to assist 
in the boarding operation. If M/V Bass 12's captain permits boarding and inspection, obtaining Flag 
State's consent will not be necessary. If boarding is conducted and Ammonium perchlorate is 
discovered and verified, this finding will be duly reported to the UN Sanctions Committee by the 
State performing the boarding. If boarding cannot be conducted, the suspicions that the vessel was 
carrying prohibited material may also be shared with this Committee. 
 
Course of Action Rationale  
 
Green suggests that sufficient intelligence exist to determine that the ship owned by Quartz is 
transporting prohibited items in support of Quartz's WMD program and is a clear breach of 
UNSCR 2846.  Green also has reason to believe that the ship is on its way (departed in last 24hrs) 
and Elm may have the strongest legal basis to act now, since the ship will be bunkered in its 
territorial waters shortly.  
  
Impediments to Executing Course of Action  
 
If the vessel has left Elm territorial waters, the refusal of country Pecan (Flag State) to grant 
boarding permission to M/V Bass 12 may derail Green’s course of action. Should M/V Bass 12 turn 
from the Exercise Area, it is still possible for the vessel to circumnavigate the Exercise Area to reach 
country Ebony. Another country team suggested that no domestic jurisdiction exist to board, since 
the ship will not enter Green's territorial waters. If the conveyance changes the flag to Quartz, 
permission to board by Pecan may not be sufficient. Similarly, Elm territorial waters may be the only 
location to conduct an interdiction (Quartz has naval forces in the region). Elm does not have a 
history of being proactive on interdiction cases. There may be concerns with sharing intelligence 
with Elm, which might request a lot of information. The political willingness of regional partners to 
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interdict the M/V Bass 12 will limit alternative courses of action. Regional partners also risk military 
escalation by Quartz as a result of Green’s decision to unilaterally interdict the M/V Bass 12.  
 
Proliferation Event 6: Granite attempt to obtain advanced gyroscopes 
Interdiction Actions 
  
Green would initially identify possible connections to the broker himself. If the broker is considered 
a suspect, then Green would consider taking immediate direct actions to interdict the shipment. 
Green will not take any interdiction actions in the case of the aircraft carrying cargo, since it is not 
posing direct threat to its country. In Green’s judgment, the customs agency of Spruce should 
control and verify broker's documents and luggage.  Green will also try to influence Spruce to 
investigate the case using diplomatic tools and methods, which go far beyond the present case. In 
order to do so, Green will cooperate diplomatically with country Birch behind the scenes at the 
highest possible level using direct contacts. Similarly, another country team said that they would 
request country Spruce to interdict the cargo and order the plane to offload the cargo. They would 
then open up an investigation to the broker RBS and initiate a criminal action according to 
proliferation law 266 of 14 March 2011. 
International Coordination and Cooperation 
One country suggested that they would immediately send a diplomatic demarche to Spruce to 
request they interdict the cargo upon arrival. Simultaneously, Green would send a diplomatic 
demarche to Teak (registration flag of the plane) to ask for the offloading of the cargo upon arrival 
at Spruce airport. If it was determined that the broker broke national law, Green would ask Interpol 
for relevant assistance. 
 
Course of Action Rationale  
 
Green is obligated under UNSCR 2904 to first and foremost seize the broker, if necessary. Green 
seeks to reduce the risk of the proliferation and development of the missile program in accordance 
with UNSCRs and PSI. As a PSI partner, Spruce is asked to interdict the cargo to abide by the 
Security Council resolution and to avoid becoming involved in Granite illicit acquisition. Indeed, 
MBDO is a listed entity under UNSCR 2904 (the university is suspected to be linked with BMDO).   
As a flag state of the plane, Teak has a special responsibility to avoid being involved in Granite illicit 
acquisition and thus abide by the resolution. For both countries, working toward the interdiction of 
the cargo would avoid damages to their public image. 
 
Impediments to Executing Course of Action  
 
Green will do all that it can to influence Spruce to take action.  The short window of opportunity in 
this proliferation event makes all instruments of national power and cooperation between PSI states 
vital.  
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Proliferation Event 7: Country Flint attempt to obtain Hydrogen Fluoride 
Interdiction Actions 
 
Hydrogen Fluoride is a dual use good under the Defense and Strategic Goods List. All three country 
teams selected to interdict M/V Trout to determine the exact nature of the goods in question. This 
intervention would occur on Board M/V Trout or following unloading pier side. Customs and 
technical experts seek to review and validate related documentation to determine if the goods are 
subject to a control regime. If they are, the goods would be immediately seized by customs 
authorities.   
 
International Coordination and Cooperation 
Green would seek information, technical assistance and influence Pine authorities to not fulfill the 
contract to supply and request return of the shipment to Pine. Following the interdiction, Green 
would speak to Pine, Flint and Coconut (as flag state) about the goods and their obligations under 
international agreements. Seizure of goods would then be reported to proper national and 
international authorities.  
 
Course of Action Rationale  
 
Green is strongly committed to leveraging the international regimes such as the CWC and the 
national groups. The acquisition of chemical weapons would negatively affect regional security and 
stability, and requires robust multinational cooperation and coordination.  Several country teams 
noted that PSI principles of interdiction, import and export controls and national legislation 
provides enough legal reasoning to interdict the shipment of concern in Green’s port.   
 
Impediments to Executing Course of Action  
 
Green international legal obligations have to be implemented in national legislation before being 
internally binding. Information sharing challenges also exist with Pine. From an operational 
perspective, one country team’s decision to interdict the vessel at sea would require Green to 
sanitize intelligence received for information sharing purposes.   
 
Proliferation Event 8: Country Shale attempt to obtain technical assistance 
Interdiction Actions 
 
Upon entering Green, all three country teams selected to employ law enforcement officials to 
interview the scientist regarding the purpose of his travels and inspect the two checked bags. 
Experts may be used to help evaluate the contents of the bags. The scientist would be detained by 
local customs authorities during the inspection. This suspicion violates Beijing Convention, Article 1 
para 1. (i) (4) as well as numerous Green national laws.  The inspection would be made from an 
inbound flight in Green airport to avoid delaying departure times.    If evidences (e.g., plans, 
drawings, and laptop) are collected and those are of sensitive technology, the scientist will be 
charged on criminal offences and prosecuted under Green national laws.  In the event a breach of 
Beijing Convention, Green would look to extract the scientist to ASH for due process by ASH 
authorities. 
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International Coordination and Cooperation 
Green will contact Ash and inform them about detention of their scientist and request search and 
seizure of further potential evidence (e. g. search of research facilities, questioning of co-workers 
etc.)   Green would remind Ash of its own obligations under the Beijing Convention, UNSCR 1540, 
and CWC if the scientist broke related Ash laws as well. Specific information that would be acquired 
includes detailed personal information of the engineer, flight information, and specific information 
on the proliferation technology (plans, drawings, and electronic devices), as well as information on 
the employment contract, possible foreign payments, and additional financial information of the 
service. 
 
Course of Action Rationale  
 
Under the Beijing Convention, it is a crime to transport material, including software and related 
technology that leads to the design of WMD.  In addition, there may be national criminal violations 
for possession of WMD technology information.  If Green finds such material on this person or his 
baggage, the individual may be subject to criminal charges that we adopted pursuant to the Beijing 
Convention and existing domestic laws. Green must act now as the entity and baggage will be within 
GREEN territorial control, jurisdiction and within a contained environment.  
 
Impediments to Executing Course of Action  
 
The investigation into the person of interest may take a substantial period of time as files may be 
encrypted or are just too complicated to evaluate within a few hours at the airport. Lack of 
intelligence and legal basis at the onset of the investigation may prove problematic in detaining the 
scientist and his belongings.  If they did not find any information on his person or bags showing an 
intellectual transfer of WMD technology during a search, Green would likely let the individual 
continue on his scheduled flight, but continue to investigate. There could be diplomatic effects with 
the country of Ash if the scientist is detained and no criminal evidence is discovered. There must be 
physical evidences such as plans, drawings, and flow diagrams to demonstrate the transfer of 
technology.   
 
Proliferation Event 9: Country Flint attempt to obtain Kynar piping 
Interdiction Actions 
 
The transit of Kynar Piping appears to be a violation of Green export control laws.  Information 
would be passed to relevant Green law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Green would first 
determine whether the shipment is licensable. If no license is found, then Green customs officials 
would exercise border search authority to inspect the shipments in the FTZ or the port of export 
(depending upon the timing of when information was obtained).  Green Customs would ask for 
relevant export documentation to determine whether information is false, and may also attempt to 
get more information from Superior Manufacturing. After confirmation that goods are in violation 
of Green law, the goods would be seized.  Green would conduct further investigation to determine 
whether criminal violations exist. Another country team suggested that they would request the 
company to repackage in Green based on foreign trade act and prevent the company from exporting 
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the Kynar pining to Flint. Green will urge that company to transport to alternative destinations. The 
release of goods from the FTZ for onwards transportation to Flint requires a customs declaration 
including a valid export license (catch-all), based on product assessments. Another country team said 
they would intervene when the flight arrives at North Airport to check whether the Kynar piping is 
part of the cargo.  
  
International Coordination and Cooperation 
Green would likely coordinate with country Ash for further information and action under the 
CMAA or request that Ash obtain company information from Superior Manufacturing.  Green 
could also attempt to obtain information from Superior Manufacturing directly.  Green would 
attempt to put pressure on both Ash and Superior Manufacturing to cooperate and cease trade with 
Tangerine or face sanctions, such as denying further imports or exports through Green. 
 
Course of Action Rationale  
 
The illicit goods are in violation of Green export control laws and the international obligations, most 
notably the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Foreign Trade Act, and the Beijing Convention. 
Timing is very important because the goods are within Green’s territory. 
 
Impediments to Executing Course of Action  
 
Several country teams noted no major impediments to their respective courses of action. However, 
one country team suggested that limited information exists to determine whether the scientist faces 
criminal violations. Investigations would be ongoing.  Careful and creative cooperation with Flint is 
required because they are not a party to the Beijing Convention and SUA protocol.  
 
Proliferation Event 10: Country Shale attempt to obtain Glass Lined Reactor Vessels 
Interdiction Actions 
 
Basing on justified suspicions regarding possible transit of WMD related materials onboard of the 
plane (flying over the Pecan territory) and in accordance with the Beijing Convention (Article 1 para. 
1 p. (i)(4); Article 8a; Article 16), which has been also ratified by Pecan, Green would encourage 
Pecan to take all possible measures to stop the delivery. Before requesting actions, Green will ask 
Walnut to confirm that the suspected cargo is indeed on board of the plane.  Because Walnut is a 
CWC Party, Green would request Walnut authorities to order the plane to return to the airport.  
Following the flight route, Green will initiate two simultaneous demarches to Redwood and Pecan 
informing them of our demarche toward Walnut and potentially notifying them on the opportunity 
to interdict the plane during its transit in their airspace territory.  
 
International Coordination and Cooperation 
Green will inform appropriate services of Pecan on suspicion of the illegal end-use of GLRV by the 
Shell Research University, with the possible intention to manufacture chemical weapons or its 
components (where the Article 2 para. (b)(ii) ). 2. On the basis of reciprocity, Green will ask Pecan 
to take appropriate actions and share relevant data. 
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Course of Action Rationale  
 
The Beijing Convention (Article 1 para. 1 p. (i)(4); Article 8a; Article 16) provides clear rationale for 
intervention.  
 
Impediments to Executing Course of Action  
 
Green cannot act on its own or involve Redwood, which also has not ratified the Beijing 
Convention. Disclosing information with non-PSI endorsing states remains problematic.  Even 
though Redwood is a PSI partner, it lacks experience interdicting shipments of proliferation 
concern.  
Proliferation Event 11: Country Flint attempt to obtain Corrosion Resistant Valves 
Interdiction Actions 
 
Green will explore prosecution of both Green Nationals by Pine and Ash, as the nationals are 
currently located and have presumably committed the offences in these jurisdictions, who are both 
signatories of the Beijing Convention. If Pine and Ash do not prosecute, Green will remind them of 
their obligations to extradite or prosecute, and as a last resort, would seek extradition of the Green 
Nationals to be prosecuted in Green. Another country team tasked their intelligence agency to scope 
HUMINT operations on the two Green nationals (in Ash and Pine) in order to better understand 
procurement networks and end users, and investigate future deals and wider financial network. 
Another country team instructed their transportation to land the aircraft in Green under the Beijing 
Convention. Once on the ground, Green customs would inspect the aircraft. If aircraft returns to 
Pine instead of landing in Green, Green will request that Pine inspect aircraft cargo under Beijing 
Convention and CWC.  Follow up HUMINT operations will confirm information on shipments, 
which in turn, would be released to Pine and Ash.  
  
International Coordination and Cooperation 
Green will request that Pine investigate the export of the CRVs, and possibly revoke the export 
license previously granted. Green will demand that Pine fulfills their obligations under the Beijing 
Convention and CWC in respect of both this shipment and any future shipments. Green will build 
further regional support to dissuade Flint from developing a CW program and seek resolution. Over 
the long-term, Green will intensify efforts to encourage Pine and Ash to endorse the PSI principles. 
 
Course of Action Rationale  
 
The Beijing Convention provides a strong legal basis for Pine and Ash to prosecute the individuals 
involved, since the offence of arranging the transport took place in those territories and the aircraft 
is Pine-registered. Presumably, it will be easier for these countries to obtain the necessary evidence 
and mount the prosecution.  
 
  
 
 
29 
 
Impediments to Executing Course of Action  
 
The Beijing Convention may not permit seizure of the CRVs if the aircraft is only present on Green 
territory due to Green forcing the aircraft to land. Sensitivity of intelligence sources will need to be 
protected. No UNSCRs provide legal rationale for intervention.  Pine's previous lack of cooperation 
on interdiction cases and incomplete intelligence creates additional uncertainties. Given that Ash and 
Pine usually reject cooperation on interdiction cases, Green will not seek their assistance with 
gathering HUMINT on the Green national resident in their countries.  
 
Proliferation Event 12: Country Shale attempt to obtain a Gas Monitoring System 
Interdiction Actions 
 
Green will leverage customs agency to detain and examine the item of proliferation concern to 
determine whether it breaches the Customs Act. If there are regulations against Shale under the 
Special Economic Measures Act, then Green would seize the item as a breach of the Customs Act, 
and dispose of it accordingly. Another country team suggested that they will first host an urgent 
interagency collaboration meeting and then put a hold on the chartered Shale Air Cargo flight. 
Green customs officials will then inspect the aircraft while Green Air Force assets are on stand to 
interdict the chartered Shale Air Cargo flight in case it attempts to escape. Green will also inform 
Ash, Shale, and Birch of the interdiction through a diplomatic channel and request continued 
cooperation on future similar cases.  
  
International Coordination and Cooperation 
Green will ask Birch for evidence on the financial relationship and the negotiations (contracts) 
between the broker (PBS) and Ballistic Missile Defence Organization (BMDO) in country Shale. 
Under Beijing Convention, Green will request extradition of the broker from Ash.  
 
Course of Action Rationale  
 
Green has the item in its territory for a short period of time and is increasingly concerned about 
Shale's proliferation activities and the threat posed to Green and their neighboring countries.  
 
Impediments to Executing Course of Action  
 
Ash, although a signatory of Beijing Convention, is confrontational with Green and may not 
cooperate. One country team noted that the goods in transit are exempted from some of its export 
control laws. Due to significant time constraints, rapid decision making is needed prior to seeking 
outside assistance or coordination. However, intelligence from Birch is based on preliminary 
assessments and insufficient evidence may hinder Green and other countries to prosecute Shale. 
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Functional Group Observations 
 
Diplomatic  
Issue for Discussion: 
Players from Country Cluster A and B:  Players deliberated on the role that interdiction plays in their 
country’s counter proliferation strategy vis-à-vis Flint/Shale (emerging states of proliferation 
concern without any UNSCRs against them) 
Players from Country Cluster C and D:  From proliferation event 10, the approach to Redwood, Pecan, 
and Walnut to convince them to take action against the shipment of glass-lined reactor vessels as 
they overfly Redwood and Pecan. Specifically, players discussed the role that an in-force Beijing 
Convention played in their diplomatic approaches. 
 
Commonalities and Differences  
Members of diplomatic group B suggested that all states have a political and moral duty to take 
action, but had no legal grounds and means to take unilateral action. Diplomatic actions included a 
demarche to Walnut to inform and ask to take action and call back the plane to Walnut or order it to 
land in Pecan or, preferably, Redwood.  All three states are CWC members and Redwood being a 
PSI endorsee is more likely to take action. Several countries also opted to send demarches to Pecan 
and Redwood to inform them about the cargo on board and about demarches sent to Walnut. 
Green diplomatic officials also choose to send demarches to Pecan and Redwood requesting that 
they make overflight conditional to technical landing if the plane does not return to Walnut and to 
interdict the listed goods on board on the basis of their CWC obligations. If the plane returns to 
Walnut, Green diplomats will ask Walnut authorities to cancel the export license and to take action 
to prevent further export to Shale.  In the longer term Green will encourage Pecan and Walnut to 
become PSI endorsees. 
Diplomatic Team C agreed to engage Pecan diplomatically using ratification of the Beijing 
Convention as a rationale for their action. Pecan’s failure to act will likely be raised as a violation of 
the CWC since Pecan is a signatory and allowed this export transit to take place.  Green diplomats 
will also discuss its concerns about Shale's CW program at the CWC.  Even though Shale is not a 
signatory to CWC, they could still be the subject of sanctions from the UNSC, upon the 
recommendation of the OPCW. Team C agreed that given the time involved, it would be almost 
impossible to act in time for Pecan to force the plane to land. Most of the diplomatic efforts would 
likely take place after the fact and would be focused on preventing this type of event from occurring 
in the future. This incident could lead to greater information sharing and a formal agreement 
between Green and Pecan. Green will also approach Walnut after the fact to explain the connections 
between the Shale Research University and BMDO in Shale and encourage them to strengthen their 
export control regimes and consider joining relevant export control regimes. Team C also suggested 
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that encouraging Redwood to sign the Beijing Convention would help them identify existing legal 
authorities to force the plane to land and be inspected.      
Diplomatic teams C and D cited no major differences in their national approaches to the 
proliferation events 7-12. Conversely, diplomatic team A relied heavily on diplomatic demarches to 
remind countries of their international obligations and relevant domestic laws. In most cases, one 
country had necessary domestic laws without any requirement for diplomatic engagement, while 
another had domestic laws, but used diplomacy to mitigate side effects and remind the supplier 
countries that they had similar obligations under international agreements. Team A agreed that 
information obtained via the interdiction and investigation will be used in international multilateral 
settings to remind Flint of its international obligations to participate in the CWC and to apply 
pressure to cease its assessed pursuit of a CW program. However, different countries will have 
different thresholds for doing so in a multilateral setting based on individual diplomatic and political 
considerations. 
A country's foreign policy goals will affect exactly how it chooses to engage diplomatically during or 
following an interdiction. For instances, some countries recognize that they possess very strong 
domestic export control laws and have explicitly identified counter proliferation outside of its 
borders as a priority. This approach in turn drives regular diplomatic engagement to share 
information on proliferation and urges action even on cases outside domestic borders. Many 
countries do not have a similar emphasis on acting on proliferation events outside their borders. 
CCP Tools 
Existing CCP tools related to the proliferation events in the scenarios include Air Interdiction 
Transshipments Free Trade Zone Best Practices, Australia’s Interdiction Checklist, and Singapore’s 
Post-Interdiction Checklist. Several of these tools describe the legal rationales for air interdiction, 
beyond the Beijing Convention and could be useful when demarching Redwood. Green could also 
share legal authority papers with Walnut to help them strengthen their export control system and 
illustrate what legal frameworks are helpful for carrying out counter proliferation activities. Based on 
the various CCP tools related to these scenarios, it may be helpful to create one PSI checklist that 
consolidates the best practices offered by the various states to date. Existing tools may not be 
sufficient to deal with time sensitive situations, such as forcing Pecan to land the plane immediately.   
A paper explaining what authorities could be granted by the Beijing Convention would provide 
greater support to PSI member states. OEG-sponsored workshops for signatories of Beijing 
Convention could draft a product to help states better understand existing legal authorities available 
under the Convention Model legislation. Specifically, this will help states understand how to 
implement the Beijing Convention Checklist and determine whether and which provide states the 
power to act in these situations, and identify points of contact to support rapid information sharing 
and decision-making. Lastly, a tool that discusses liability issues in the event a plane is forced to land 
for inspection and best practices for how to treat the passengers, crew, other cargo, would help 
political leaders make more informed decisions.   
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Legal 
Issue for Discussion: 
Players from Country Cluster A or B:  From proliferation event 8, players examined the legal basis their 
country would use to stop, question, detain, or reroute the engineer connecting through their 
international airport and similarly the legal basis for inspecting or seizing the engineer’s luggage.  
Specifically, players discussed how various international legal frameworks (i.e., the Beijing 
Convention or the CWC) would play in your legal support/justification for your actions. 
Players from Country Cluster C or D:  From proliferation event 11, players explored the legal basis in 
their country cluster to: (1) Deny overflight, interdict or take no action against the shipment of 
corrosive-resistant valves overflying your territory on the Pine-flagged passenger/cargo aircraft; and 
(2) Establish jurisdiction over offenses committed by Green Nationals 1 and 2 (or not) and pursue 
extradition (or not).  Specifically, players discussed how international legal frameworks (i.e., the 
Beijing Convention, Chicago Convention or the CWC) would influence their legal support or 
justification for action. 
Commonalities and Differences  
Team A relied on domestic legislative implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. To 
stop the engineer from continuing his journey, the team relied on the fact that the engineer was on a 
watch list (presumably because of his CW proliferation activities).  All three countries legal systems 
provide for the detention and questioning of suspected proliferators through legislation that has 
domestically implemented international obligations.  All three countries also maintain lists of 
proliferators and lists of both entities and persons suspected of being involved with proliferation. 
Team B relied on customs border authority to stop, detain, search and question the engineer.  A 
court order or probable cause was deemed not required.  Assuming the engineer had physical items 
(e.g., schematics, plans, software) and intent to transfer to Shale, both countries in Team B could 
pursue the case as a criminal violation of export control laws.   Also, both could pursue a criminal 
prosecution under Beijing Convention implementing legislation based on fact that the aircraft landed 
in Green with the suspect on board the aircraft. Team B agreed that prosecution would be difficult if 
the engineer did not have physical items.    
Team C suggested that the preferred approach is to deny overflight to force the plane to return to 
Pine.  It was unclear whether all countries have jurisdiction over possible Beijing Convention 
offences. The use of actionable and reliable intelligence to identify and seize goods is essential when 
confronting issues relevant to the implementing the Beijing Convention. While Green would have 
jurisdiction over both Green Nationals for possible Beijing Convention offences, Pine and Ash 
would be the preferred jurisdiction to undertake prosecution.      
Regarding international legal frameworks, all three countries represented in Team D are parties to 
the CWC and the Chicago Convention. At the national level, all there countries leveraged national 
laws and regulations, and incorporated Export Control Regimes Lists in order to examine the nature 
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of the dual use item in question.  Regarding overflight denial, Team D agreed that the Chicago 
Convention can be applied to deny overflight of the plane. Team D would request Pine (flag state of 
the plane) to order the craft to return home and deny access to national airspace in order to disrupt 
the transfer. If the plane ignores the denial, Team D agreed to use coercion to escort the plane out 
of the airspace and force it to land.  
Team A differed on the use of visas in the scenario. One country requires transit visas in most 
circumstances, while two other countries noted that they do not. Since the engineer was on a watch 
list, it is possible that he would not have been granted a visa to transit in country Green. The 
difference in transit visas is based on a number of factors, including how strict a state’s immigration 
laws, and level of transit passengers a state experiences. Given that each country is a PSI OEG 
member, their approaches to countering proliferation may end up being quite similar.  
CCP Tools 
Existing CCP tools do not specifically deal with the transporting of intellectual property. While they 
deal with transporting materials and technology used in the fabrication or design of biological, 
chemical or nuclear weapons, the question of technical expertise is not as clear. This may be due to 
the fact that proliferation of expertise has largely been dealt with by the UNSC through specific 
targeting resolutions (for example, resolutions specifically targeting the Iranian and North Korean 
nuclear programs - UNSCR 1929 & 1874). However, the Model National Response Plan,  Counter 
proliferation through Air Interdiction: An Overview of Legal Principles, and France’s Inspection And Assessment 
Methods, as well as Australia’s Interdiction Checklist may all prove useful in the scenarios examined over 
the course of game play.  
In terms of model national legislation, 2 PSI countries have legislation dealing with the intangible 
transfer of technology and expertise which may provide a good 'catch-all' piece of legislation to 
perform the function of the more targeted UNSCRs. An updated national authorities matrix (e.g., 
border inspection, air interdiction, etc.) and best practices regarding the prosecution of nationals 
committing proliferation related offences abroad are two additional CCP tools that should be 
considered.  
Customs and Law Enforcement  
Issue for discussion: 
Players from Country Cluster A or B:  From proliferation event 9, players examined applicable national 
customs laws, policies, and capabilities to interdict the hydrogen fluoride and the Kynar piping as 
they undergo transshipment in their country. Players further compared and contrasted approaches 
between the item in the FTZ and the item not in the FTZ. 
Players from Country Cluster C or D:  From proliferation event 12, players explored the national 
customs laws, policies, and capabilities used to interdict the gas monitoring system as it transit your 
country 
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Commonalities and Differences 
Team A agreed that Green is able to search and seize on the basis of national legislative authority 
and international controls (e. g. CWC, AG). Team B agreed to detain the goods using national 
authorities if the intelligence was deemed valid. The legal basis was common for all of the states in 
that once the goods entered Green, they were now subject to national export control laws regardless 
if it resides in a Free Trade Zone or in a country’s port. Similarly, Team B agreed to evaluate the 
intelligence and make an assessment to act based on the confidence they had in the information and 
the source. Team C decided to enforce legislation by each countries respective customs agency to 
foster international law enforcement cooperation and share information related to the disposal of 
goods and licensing.  All three countries in Team D applied the same international regulations for 
transit and transshipment.    
Countries that have free trade zones have additional authorities to inspect.  The licensing bodies of 
PSI member states differ in some ways, but all have national authorities to temporarily detain the 
goods for inspection and conduct a more comprehensive investigation.  The detention process is 
similar to the decision to issue a license, although in some countries multiple agencies have to get 
together and have evidence presented. Not all customs agencies can make decisions to forfeit the 
goods and serve as the permit licensing agency. The definition and interpretation of transit and 
transshipment in the real-world provides some ambiguity when countering the proliferation of 
WMD that moves both at sea and air.    
CCP Tools 
The Australian Interdiction Checklist, Germany’s Transit and Transshipment Paper, and the U.S 
Free Trade Zone Best Practice and Interdiction Disposition and Liability papers are existing CCP 
tools that provide relevant guidance to assist PSI member states during a real world proliferation 
event. Other notable law enforcement CCP tools discussed include: Germany’s Contribution Paper 
on Critical Capabilities and Practices, Inspection and Identification and Transit and Transshipment; 
Poland’s Basic Elements of an Export Control System; United States’ Transit and Transshipment: A 
Common PSI Understanding?, and Guidelines for Advanced Cargo Data Requirements and Sharing;  
Singapore’s Introductory Checklist addressing Post-Interdiction Issues; and Australia and New 
Zealand’s Model National Response Plans (MNRP).  Updating common guidelines a regular basis 
(at the same time in each country) and translated into national languages would strengthen the PSI 
communities CCP tool kit.    
Military  
Issue for discussion: 
Players from Country Clusters C or D:  From proliferation event 5, players identified, which, if any, 
military actions taken they would pursue to lead or assist in the interdiction of the rocket fuel 
oxidizer on M/V Bass Twelve. 
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Commonalities and Differences  
Asking ELM to interdict M/V BASS12 in its territorial waters would be the most effective military 
action. This would minimize risk to both mission and forces and increase the probability of 
interdicting the shipment of concern. If Elm decides not to interdict, Green will ask Pecan to give a 
flag state consent in order to interdict on open waters. If Pecan denies this request, Green will ask 
Poplar and Birch-both PSI endorsing states- if either of them can ask PECAN for flag state consent.  
If there is a proof of changing flags, the ship becomes stateless and Green maritime forces will 
interdict the ship. Team D also agreed that a maritime solution to intercept the vessel was the most 
effective course of action. While Elm’s maritime forces would be the preferred choice to lead this 
effort, Green forces will interdict the shipment in its own territorial waters or working with allied 
forces in in international waters. Team A agreed to consult with the other Task Force countries 
taking place in the Counter Piracy exercise and with the Flag country to inspect the ship. Sending an 
element of the task force to check the flag, and potentially board the vessel to verify the flag and 
documentation was the preferred military course of action. Air assets will conduct surveillance 
mission to inspect the shipment from the air.  
Several countries navies are organized in a self-defense role and are limited to projecting maritime 
force far from its shores. However, Coast Guard assets can conduct maritime missions to assist in 
the interdiction of a ship in international waters. Several countries preferred to work in a coalition 
environment in order to take advantage of national laws and capabilities.  
CCP Tools 
Existing CCP tools related to countering WMD proliferation by military forces are limited. This may 
be due to classification restrictions, but creating an official unclassified version that can only be 
disseminated to PSI member states would help alleviate this barrier.  Creating and sharing of best 
practices and checklists related to interdicting shipments at sea and disposing of goods would 
strengthen the PSI CCP tool kit.  
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INFORMING THE GAME OBJECTIVES   
 
PSI 2014 served as both an educational and analytic game for the players and game sponsor. The 
educational component provided players with a decision-making experience that illustrated teaching 
points and fostered cooperation, while the analytic component acquired information and data to 
assist future decision-makers.  This section of the report summarizes all player survey responses and 
qualitative data generated throughout game play in order to inform the four overarching game 
objectives.   
Beijing Convention  
 
Objective#1:  Build a shared appreciation for how ratification and eventual entry into force 
of the Beijing Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International 
Civil Aviation changes the status quo with respect to counter-proliferation laws, policies, 
practices, and obligations.   
Figure 5 illustrates that majority of players gained a greater appreciation of how the ratification and 
entry into force of the Beijing Convention will change the status quo with respect to counter-
proliferation laws, policies, practices, and obligations.   
 
Figure 6. Appreciation of the ratification and entry into force of the Beijing Convention 
There was broad consensus that the Beijing Convention should be adopted and standardized 
internationally. One player said, “The Beijing Convention sets an international standard that 
everyone needs to reach. We need to aid other PSI endorsees on this standard.”  There were several 
comments regarding improvements to the Beijing Convention and limitations for addressing specific 
threats. The practical application of the Beijing Convention remains a challenge and requires further 
attention. A CCP tool to “operationalize” the Beijing Convention is needed. By its very nature, air 
interdiction requires rapid decision making and little time to take action. In many cases, without a 
CCP tool, the Beijing Convention would be difficult to enforce due to the very short time frames 
there are to make decisions and take action. The Beijing Convention does not address interdiction of 
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intangible information, and would thus be in-effective against this threat. There is not a common 
understanding regarding rights of a state to make overflight contingent on landing and inspection 
(scheduled vs non-scheduled flights) 
One player noted, “CCP (tools) to ‘operationalize’ the Beijing Convention should address time 
sensitivity of many issues the Beijing Convention attempts to resolve.”   Players widely agreed that 
these problems could be addressed by creating a new CCP tool to operationalize the Beijing 
Convention.  Several players recommended an OEG sponsored workshop to develop this CCP tool.  
To be effective, players pointed out that the CCP should do the following: 
 Explain precisely (standardize) what authorities are granted by the Beijing Convention. 
 Include a tool to rapidly determine who is responsible to act in a situation 
 Support time sensitive decision making 
 Set an international standard for application of the Beijing Convention 
 Allow states to understand and standardize what authorities are given (or not given) under 
the Beijing Convention. 
Players discussed that the Beijing Convention does not cover interdiction on intangible information.  
One scenario included interdiction of a scientist carrying information in the form of knowledge.  
Players concluded that without tangible evidence, either on his person, luggage or digital information 
on his computer, it would be difficult to detain him.  The Beijing Convention unfortunately does not 
provide a method to interdict this type of intangible transfer of information.  Information and 
knowledge related to WMD transported via the internet does not apply to the Beijing Convention. 
In general, states did not have a common understanding of their rights and authorities under the 
Beijing Convention.  This lack of understanding may make it more challenging and less likely for a 
nation to respond rapidly enough to counter a threat. For this reason standardized authorities are 
crucial to timely decision making and action.  
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Transit and Transshipment  
 
Objective#2:  Build a shared understanding of international standards, national laws, 
policies, and terminology related to shipments in transit and transshipment among PSI 
member states. 
 
As depicted in figure 6, majority of players gained a better understanding of international standards, 
national laws, policies, and terminology related to shipments in transit transshipment among PSI 
member states.   
 
Figure 7.  Better Understanding of Transit/Transshipment 
Players recognized the need to develop a deeper understanding of which national and international 
laws and policies can be applied to counter proliferation events related to transit and transshipment. 
Understanding each country’s definition and approach to transit and transshipment was 
characterized as a necessary step towards cooperation. Tracking licenses from origin to destination 
when a vessel or aircraft is in a place of transit or transshipment was also touted as an area of 
emphasis for decision-makers. Similarly, the difference in transit visas is based on a number of 
factors, including a state’s immigration laws, and the level of transit passenger throughput in a given 
state.   
 
Players acknowledged that obtaining the legal authority and capability to deter and stop any transfer 
to end-users of proliferation concern whether transiting your territory or not are critical to 
preventing state and non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
missile-related capabilities. Entry and exit information for transshipments should be thoroughly 
reviewed by state customs officials and national security agencies with technical knowledge of 
controlled items and the methods for evaluating its potential end use. Sharing of best practices 
related to how organizations perform this function was often discussed throughout game play.  
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Disposition and Liability 
 
Objective #3:  Build a shared understanding for the key issues and challenges related to 
disposition and liability aspects of PSI and how national laws, policies and procedures differ 
amongst PSI OEG member states. 
 
Figure 7 illustrates that 76 percent of players either agreed or somewhat agreed to gaining a better 
understanding of key issues and challenges related to disposition and liability.  Player understanding 
of disposition and liability was less compared to the previous two objectives. It is posited that this 
may be a result of scheduling and time constraints on day one, which prevented the players from 
examining disposition and liability in greater debt as functional groups. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Better Understanding of Disposition and Liability  
Determining the party responsible for compensating the ship, aircraft, owner or operator for any 
delays, as well as the policy and legal basis for this determination was a topic of discussion across 
several proliferation events. During proliferation event four, players assessed that sufficient 
reasonable cause allowed Green to take action to prevent Granite from attempting to procure 
sophisticated circuit boards made with military-grade analog to digital converters to enhance the 
accuracy and reliability of their ballistic missiles. The question of any possible compensation has to 
be verified and determined by agencies involved. One player team suggested that their government 
would not be liable for damages due to actions taken in good faith, while another country team held 
their customs office responsible for compensation under their national Customs Act. Ownership of 
the item of proliferation concern would either remain with commercial entities involved or the 
Green Customs Office, according to two country teams.  Initial seizure of circuit boards made with 
military-grade analog to digital converters would remain with appropriate customs and law 
enforcement agencies for investigation. Once the courts have determined an offence and provided a 
forfeiture order, the item will remain under the custody of a state’s customs and law enforcement 
agency to be properly disposed.   
 
Players acknowledged that liability and compensation questions related to Quartz’s attempt to obtain 
aluminum 7075 “need to be addressed, but not a show-stopper.” Compensation issues discussed 
during the proliferation event related to radiation hardened microcircuits included identifying and 
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verifying the party responsible through interagency coordination meetings, and customs officers 
being immune from liability for acts within the scope of their duties in inspecting and detaining 
merchandise.  However, players recognized that there are ways to compensate parties for delay or 
damages administratively through diplomatic channels. Ownership of the radiation hardened 
microcircuits will initially remain with the exporter. Costs of the detention are borne by the importer 
or carrier under several country laws, while several other country teams highlighted that specific laws 
require the exporter to bear costs related to fees and offloading handling materials.  Several country 
teams highlighted that the state responsible for offloading the cargo is most likely responsible for 
compensation to the ship, aircraft, owner, or operator, while others deemed the flag state or 
shipping company responsible. If determined that laws are broken, then a PSI member state would 
seize and forfeit the title of the item from the owner to their country. The shipment could then be 
transferred to a secondary location or stored in a seaport or airport warehouse until further action is 
taken to properly dispose of the items.  
Critical Capabilities and Practices  
 
Objective#4: Identify changes to existing CCP tools or potential new CCP tools as it relates 
to challenges of air interdiction, transit and transshipment, and disposition and liability. 
 
 
Figure 9. Data visualization based on in vivo grounded theory using i2 Text Chart 
Player derived key themes and phrases from game play were coded to identify concepts. Researchers 
attempted to ground these concepts in the data according to grounded theory protocol (Glaser and 
Straus, 1967). In this way, emergent themes were “grounded both empirically (in the data) and 
conceptually (linked to the wider analytic context)” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 525). Using i2 TextChart 
(version 8) software application, the open-ended responses in the individual survey questionnaires 
and individual cell deliverables were searched for these concepts. Based on player-derived themes, 
critical capabilities and practices need to be strengthened in order to inform leaders during time 
sensitive decision-making environments.  Repetitive searches yielded the nodal/link relationships 
depicted through data visualization in figure 9. Each parenthetical entry indicates the number of 
times a word or phrase appeared in the data collection. 
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Figure 10. CCP Tool Management Process and Characteristics  
Based on the player insights and themes derived during post-game analysis, figure 10 depicts CCP 
tool characteristics and processes and how it plays a role in PSI. PSI Operational Experts Group 
countries acknowledged the benefit of strengthening critical interdiction capabilities and practices of 
all PSI member states. Several countries suggested sharing a subset of CCP tools with non-PSI states 
as an incentive to join the PSI community and commit to the interdiction principles. Consistent with 
these principles, players recognized the need to evolve and improve methods to counter the threat 
of WMD proliferation by identifying and sharing tools and resources that support interdiction 
related activities. Players recognized the need to introduce common processes and technologies that 
aim to facilitate the sharing of information and knowledge by various departments and agencies 
within PSI member states.   
 
Players highlighted many challenges to developing best practices and focused on solutions that 
capture lessons learned and updating check lists in real-time, phrasing lessons in terms of generic, 
actionable recommendations or tasks, and proactively encouraging PSI states to review and integrate 
CCP updates into national plans and policies. Such lessons should be both positive and negative and 
acquired quickly to avoid individuals forgetting the challenges faced during the course of a 
proliferation event. Players acknowledged that the knowledge acquired, shared, and applied through 
CCP tools are generated mainly from an experience or expert insight of a PSI member states.  
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Because some lessons learned are difficult to capture in writing, a feature that allows users to upload 
other materials such as video or audio files would allow for greater flexibility to share information. 
Disseminating lessons learned through automatic email notifications and key word or phrase 
searches would provide decision-makers a quick and effective way to apply these lessons to specific 
proliferation events and working environments. Email notifications could be further supported by 
alerting the right person or organization based on the specific data entered by the originator. 
Supporting the development and management of PSI CCP tools requires that organizations and 
agencies encourage the sharing of lessons learned by establishing “CCP” programs, policies, and 
incentives for contributors. The global knowledge of countering WMD proliferation can be 
preserved and transformed by managing a lessons learned database for current and future PSI 
practitioners.  
 
The future management of PSI CCP tools should remained stored on an unclassified central 
repository that incorporates an electronic form, which includes the common fields of data (title, 
category, applicable to, recommendation, etc.), as a way to collect and distribute lessons learned.  To 
foster greater socialization of best practices, an online discussion feature would allow PSI users to 
interact with each other through online chatting, or face-to-face discussions. The CCP tool website 
could also feature an application that allows users to search points of contacts by country, agency, 
name, or area of expertise. This will expedite decision-making and better position PSI states to 
standardize pre-decisional authorities within and across agencies. Being able to quickly identify the 
most appropriate CCP tool and assess its utility after the fact through a user rating system and 
feedback form will help publishers and consumers revise and reuse products for future decision-
makers. 
 
CCP tools are used to better understand what laws, policies, and capabilities can be applied across 
broad concepts (e.g., transit, transshipment, interdiction, etc.). Having gained a deeper appreciation 
for the complexities of individual proliferation events during game play, players advocated for CCP 
tools that are tailored to counter specific scenarios. Timely, actionable, and reliable information 
related to the sharing of best practices and intelligence was discussed as a way of supporting rapid 
decision-making during time sensitive situations. Players identified numerous knowledge gaps and 
proposed specific areas of information that could be developed and published as new CCP tools. 
They acknowledged that the application of existing national and international laws is better 
understood than courses of action or “how to approach specific situations” related to identifying, 
interdicting, seizing, and disposing of WMD and related material both. In addition to the CCP tools 
identified below, players focused on publishing CCP tools tailored for specific users or audiences 
(e.g., military, customs and law enforcement, legal, and diplomatic).    
 
New CCP tools identified by players that focus on specific courses of action on land, air, and sea 
include the following: Law enforcement inspection of goods located in a warehouse; Understanding 
how to deal with transshipment; Authorities provided by the Beijing Convention; Familiarize 
customs, law enforcement, and military personnel of the operational implications related to the 
Beijing Convention; Tracking license from origin to destination when you are in a place of transit or 
transshipment; Intangible Technology Transfer; Free Trade Zone Guidance; All national laws and 
regulations incorporated Export Control Regimes Lists; Case law regarding the prosecutions of 
nationals committing proliferation related offences abroad; Inspection And Assessment Methods ; 
Maritime Interdiction: Boarding or Diversion of a Ship; Disposal of interdicted goods; Post 
interdiction care (costs, time, advice); Explore legal liability issues in the event a plane is forced to 
land for inspection - best practices for how to treat the passengers, crew, other cargo, etc. 
 
 
43 
 
 
Figure 10 illustrates that an overwhelming majority of players indicate that existing CCP tools need 
to be strengthened and new CCP tools must be developed in order to deal with the given challenges 
of air interdiction, transit and transshipment, and disposition and liability. 
 
 
Figure 11. The Need to Strengthen Existing CCP Tools or Create New CCP Tools  
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IV. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
In addition to informing the game objectives, the researchers explored the implications of the 
findings to PSI cooperation. This section proposes those implications as well as recommendations 
to inform the future of PSI. Based on player derived themes and insights during post-game analysis, 
figure 10 depicts how authorities and political will, awareness, and capabilities contribute towards 
PSI. 
 
 
Figure 12. Influence of PSI on authorities, awareness, and capabilities   
Authorities and Political Will  
 
Players recognized the benefit of relying on existing international law and partnerships to conduct 
interdictions in international waters and airspace.  Players advocated for initially leveraging existing 
national laws to interdict vessels or aircraft passing through its territories, where they have 
jurisdiction to act. In situations where the legal authority to act may be unclear or non-existent, 
players often relied on leveraging UN Security Council Resolutions, the Beijing Convention, the 
SUA Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention as authorization to interdict a ship or 
aircraft of proliferation concern. In addition to authorities, establishing the political will begins when 
a state endorses the PSI Interdiction Principles and continues PSI cooperation to advance a nation’s 
ability to acquire authorities and political will, to gain and maintain awareness, and identify 
appropriate interdiction response and disposal capabilities.  
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Several strategic-level impediments to interdiction  highlighted by players include the unwillingness 
of nearby countries to take action to assist a state, the consequences of a country over reacting to an 
interdiction using military force, and the political and operational costs associated with not taking 
any action.  Expanding bilateral boarding agreements between PSI member states was suggested as 
an effective way to secure expedited processes or pre-approval for stopping and searching ships at 
sea. An inspection in a country’s port was preferred over interdiction in territorial waters or along 
the high seas.  States may be less likely to cooperation in international waters and interdiction along 
the high seas requires additional jurisdiction and coordination in time compressed environments.  
Determining violations for the transport of intellectual WMD material may be challenging when 
limited evidence on the person exists.  
 
Awareness  
 
Quick decision making can be further enhanced by persistent coordination and cooperation at the 
strategic (laws and policies) and operational level (customs, law enforcement, and military). 
Persistent intelligence and CCP tool sharing between PSI member states prior to a real-world 
proliferation event will better position national security decision-makers to identify pre-decisional 
authorities and mission tailored force package responses. Information and intelligence sharing 
through bi-lateral and multilateral agreements and CCP tools is a critical enabler to rapidly making 
decisions related to authorities and capabilities in time-constrained environments.   
 
The interdiction of WMD while in transit or transshipment begins with sharing information and 
intelligence related, but not limited, to the people, cargo, and vessel of proliferation concern. Armed 
with this information, lawyers, diplomats, and military and law enforcement personnel can make 
informed decisions to stop the transit of WMD and related material from reaching the land, shore, 
or sky of a nation. Additional information was often sought to better understand whether a state has 
the authority to interdict under existing national and international laws.  Players highlighted several 
impediments to intelligence sharing, including the lengthy process of acquiring and verifying 
intelligence in time sensitive situations and revealing sources and methods. Intelligence was often 
discussed as a necessary step towards establishing a legal basis for action, but as one player noted, it 
“might not meet the burden of proof.”  
 
A common vision among PSI member states that standardizes national processes and protocols for 
sharing of sensitive counter proliferation information will better position decision-makers to 
overcome intelligence sharing barriers and rapidly make decisions under time sensitive 
environments. Developing an international contact list of all relevant decision makers to help PSI 
member states acquire relevant intelligence to act quickly during a real-world proliferation event 
could further enhance this initiative.    
 
Players highlighted myriad information and intelligence requirements necessary to conduct further 
analysis and planning.  
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They are as follows:  
 Technical specification of cargo and end-use 
 End-use paper of recipient, verify plausibility of civilian end-use, end-use history and 
information and intelligence involvement between countries or companies of proliferation 
concern  
 Applicability of UNSCRs and Beijing Convention in similar cases  
 Potential logistics providers, shipment time frame, port schedule and locations  
 Flag of conveyance flown, cargo and crew manifest  
 Operational risk associated with interdiction at sea and air 
 Application of exporter and verification of exports made under granted licenses  
 Course of action by other PSI nations and active information sharing agreements  
 FTZ regulations, authorities and oversight/controls that may be used by Green to facilitate 
inspection detention. 
 Historical trends in exports with regard to trans-shipment through Green to other countries 
involved.  
Capabilities  
 
Players emphasized that searching and seizing containerized goods in international waters or in 
another country's port can be difficult given time constraints and positioning of naval and air assets.  
Due to the time constraint, encouraging rapid decision making through interagency coordination 
bodies within a government is desirable prior to seeking outside assistance or coordination. Players 
highlighted that coordination between customs agencies and the military is critical to establishing 
greater awareness and prepositioning assets in case the ship or aircraft of proliferation concern 
attempts to escape into international waters or airspace. The use of military assets as a way to deter 
or respond to any potential military reaction from a country of proliferation concern who’s cargo is 
under investigation was also emphasized during game play.  Any diversion of suspected cargo would 
be limited by the laws and political will of the country allowing the ship into port. Capability and 
capacity limitations may also limit a PSI member state’s ability to conduct surveillance and 
interdiction missions. Fostering cooperation through PSI meetings, table-top exercises, and real-
world exercises will strengthen relationships between PSI member states, and create new 
relationships with non-PSI member states to advance the global community’s interest in preventing 
the proliferation of WMD.    
 
A state’s ability to respond to a proliferation event requires authorities and political will. Upon 
establishing the requisite authorities and nurturing the political will to prevent WMD or related 
material from reaching illegitimate end-users, states must enhance their awareness of threats and 
ways to respond to these threats through sharing of intelligence and best practices. Counter 
proliferation capabilities that reside on land, air, or sea are best applied when national and 
international organizations coordinate and cooperate prior to a real-world event. When a nation is 
limited in one or more of these areas, other PSI member states can help that country build their 
 
 
47 
 
capability to bilaterally or multilaterally respond to future proliferation events. Authorities and 
political will, awareness, and capabilities can be used as framework to support military and civilian 
decision-makers develop PSI engagement strategies based on the level of contribution and capacity a 
state has in the areas of authorities, awareness, and capabilities. Sustained cooperation between a 
state’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their military and law enforcement is critical to understanding 
the strengths and limitations for a country to respond to WMD proliferation. 
 
PSI Capacity Building Framework  
 
The framework just mentioned has myriad implications for the practice of capacity building among 
PSI nations. It suggests that advancing the state of PSI should be based on evaluating and enhancing 
the authorities, political will, awareness, and operational capabilities of both PSI and non-PSI states. 
Decision-makers should consider using this self-assessment framework to inform the development 
and implementation of future PSI cooperative engagement activities. Figure 13 is merely a graphical 
aid that will give governments a visual overview of how each individual ‘s self-assessment was 
scored, which can be helpful in determining priorities-if a government scores a lower on one area 
then another, it may include a weakness or need that should be addressed.  
 
Country  PSI Member 
State 
National 
Authorities 
Political Will  Awareness  Response 
Capabilities  
Country A       
Country B      
Country C      
Country D      
 
Figure 13. Example PSI Capacity Building Framework  
 
Each area depicted can be further distilled into sub-categories that will further tailor a state’s 
approach to building the capacity of another in one of these areas. For example, regarding 
awareness, a country may have numerous intelligence sharing agreements in place, but they may be 
not an active contributor to developing CCP tools. In this case a yellow bar would be depicted to 
show only partial contribution in this area. The scoring scale used in this tool is not an absolute 
measure of capacity and governments must be judicial and thoughtful when determining PSI 
capacity building priorities and the myriad political, financial, and security factors that extend well 
beyond the purview of this framework. This framework places a heavy emphasis on information 
sharing and coordination between interagency, military, and political decision-makers. Having these 
capacities would enhance a PSI state’s ability to positively influence the outcome of an item of 
proliferation concern and would provide a general awareness of a country’s contribution towards 
PSI. The most viable nations would develop plans and policies to maximize their own contribution 
to PSI in these five critical PSI areas and leverage their own strengths to build the capacities of other 
states in these areas. Rather than consumers  
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3D Printing and the Proliferation of WMD  
 
The illicit use of 3D printing technology as a means to digitally fabricate WMD or related material as 
physical objects was a focus of player discussions. 3D printing offers many advantages to 
proliferators of WMD. It enables users to build objects from scratch quicker, easier, and cheaper 
than using commercial based manufacturing sources. A person or organization can create more 
complex objects, customize parts, and reverse engineer the manufacturing of material that may no 
longer be readily available at the time and place of their choosing.   
 
Existing national and international laws do not regulate the use of 3D printing for the purposes of 
transiting WMD or related material to end-users of concern. Capabilities to detect this technology 
and the formulation and sharing of intelligence and CCP tools are limited as well.  The proliferation 
of this technology, to include the printed items, the information, and the 3D printers should be 
further evaluated within the context of PSI. While it is extremely problematic to predict future 
outcomes, it is important to consider the likelihood and impact emerging 3D printing technology 
will have on the future proliferation of WMD.  As 3D printing technology becomes easier to access 
and shared around the world, end-users may reduce their dependency on the proliferating WMD or 
related material, as such objects can be printed at the point of need with little to no assembly.    
 
Over the long-term, this could reduce the need to manufacture, transport, store, and purchase 
WMD or related material. This has the potential to bolster a state or non-state actor’s ability to 
acquire the requisite 3D printing technology to support the manufacturing WMD or related material. 
Research into the interplay between the illicit use of 3D printing technology and WMD will become 
increasingly salient. The effects of changes in identifying, interdicting, seizing, and disposing 3D 
technology should be carefully evaluated in future PSI events. Cooperation between national and 
international law enforcement, legal, and diplomatic communities is warranted to further investigate 
possible future outcomes of 3D printing and WMD proliferation.  
 
Managing PSI Critical Capabilities and Practices 
 
Decision makers and practitioners must have access to evidence-based programs and strategies to 
improve WMD proliferation interdiction. The CCP tool kit should allow decision-makers to select 
and adapt appropriate approaches for specific contexts. In reality, much work needs to be done to 
achieve this goal, and many persistent counter-proliferation problems exist where evidence is not yet 
fully recognized. Furthermore, governments at all levels face substantial fiscal constraints and 
challenges to improving their ability to deter, detect, and interdict WMD that transits with and 
across varying domains – land, sea, air, and cyberspace. Many agencies and organizations within PSI 
governments recognize such challenges and the need to identify and build evidence based CCP tools 
with insights and recommendations that can be applied in real world settings.  
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Figure 14. A Conceptual Framework for Planning and Improving PSI CCPs 
 
Leveraging the CCP Tool management process and characteristics discussed in the previous section, 
the PSI OEG should develop and formalize a dedicated CCP Working Group aimed to encourage 
and manage the further development of CCPs that show promise for improving PSI interdiction 
outcomes. Based on the game’s findings, this group could begin by a conducting a thorough review 
of the literature and expert input to create a conceptual framework for planning and improving a 
PSI CCP tool framework that maximizes both the impact to WMD interdiction and the quality of 
information developed for CCPs.  The working group should begin with developing a working, 
consensus definition of best practices, along with criteria and processes for classifying information 
that maximizes both impact and quality of the CCPs.  
LIMITATIONS OF DATA ANALYSIS 
 
A major challenge for the War Gaming Department concerns development of a game that provides 
the robust insights into an issue or problem sought by the game’s sponsor. Accordingly, managing 
stakeholder expectations about what the final game report will tell them with respect to broad-based 
implications is essential. Stakeholders often seek findings that will provide them with predictive 
conclusions for decision-making purposes. Unfortunately, gaming is a predominately descriptive 
process because games are not experiments. Even if a game is repeated, it lacks sufficient controls 
over player inputs and the central limit theorem for a distribution to ensure validity. In other words, 
sponsors should not attempt to draw inferences beyond what a specific group of players did in a 
particular game to yield generalizability (the ability to apply the findings observed for a small 
population to the broader world around us). The 2014 Proliferation Security Initiative Game is no 
exception to this premise.  
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It should be noted that both the quantitative and qualitative datasets analyzed in this game report 
lack generalizability due to the small sample sizes of participants—none of whom were randomly 
selected from a population known to be normally distributed. However, through triangulation and 
meta-analysis, researchers enhanced the reliability and validity of findings that should prove valuable 
to inform both the sponsor and players about the challenges associated with WMD proliferation.   
 
This game was designed to be highly inductive in order to garner broad-based insights relative to the 
research questions. Inductive games leverage qualitative data to identify themes based on player 
decisions during game play. The qualitative nature of data can result in subjective findings. To 
control for the subjectivity and complexity of the research area, a number of design and analysis 
measures can be employed. Moreover, the participants in the game represented an accessible and 
purposeful sample to provide information-rich data. This purposeful sample does not necessarily 
represent the entire population from the organizations represented at the game. For this reason, 
meta-analysis should be used, whereby the findings from a single game could be combined or 
compared to findings from other similar games or studies to yield the greatest value in terms of 
implications to the research area.  
 
Two threats to internal validity concern the quality of the data collected and the accuracy of the 
analytical techniques used to review these data. To ensure quality data collection, the post-game 
analysis team relied on player-created products, such as individual survey questionnaires and cell 
deliverables. Insights extracted from these data sources were subsequently cross-checked, or 
triangulated, with other data sets including ethnographer notes to ensure accuracy and 
conclusiveness. The accuracy of the analytical techniques was enhanced by using multiple methods, 
tools, and researchers to review the same data. Methods included content analysis, grounded theory, 
and descriptive statistics. Multiple research teams reviewed the same data sets using different 
approaches. Themes and insights derived from multiple researchers and approaches reflect more 
validity than a single researcher using a single approach.  
 
To explore the degree of external validity, one must consider whether the data collected can be 
generalized across the population of subjects. The demographics of the participants provide some 
measure to assess this attribute. The game was designed to stimulate critical analysis and creative 
thinking skills. To identify the nature of PSI relationships, players were selected to represent a cross-
section of legal, diplomatic, customs and law enforcement, and military perspectives. Although the 
game had a diverse group of participants, it proves to be cost-prohibitive and too complex to have 
every perspective represented from all stakeholders associated with PSI. Therefore, some gaps in 
perspectives can be assumed for any game.  
 
 
51 
 
Annex A: Game Templates 
 
PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE 
NEWPORT 2014 
Initial Assessment Template 
Based on the initial intelligence information provided in the scenario, please answer the 
following questions in as much detail as possible given the time and information constraints: 
 What are your national policies, national and international laws, and international 
commitments currently in place that would form the basis of your reaction should your 
country become involved in some way? 
 
 What are your specific information requirements necessary to conduct further analysis 
and planning? 
 
 Are there any other issues that are potentially relevant for your country? 
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PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE 
NEWPORT 2014 
COURSE OF ACTION TEMPLATE 
For each proliferation stream: 
Considering all elements of national power, describe the interdiction action(s) your country will 
take (what, where, when, by whom – which government agency/department).  A complete 
answer includes options to address potential contingencies.  
 What supportive decisions or actions are you asking other countries or international 
organizations to take? 
 What are the policy, diplomatic, legal, and operational rationales for this action or 
decision? In other words, why this decision and why now?  
 What policy, diplomatic, legal, and operational issues restrict your actions in this 
situation? 
Assuming Green has detained the item of proliferation concern… 
1. Who owns the item interdicted? What is the legal and policy basis for this determination? 
 
2. Who will take initial possession of the item when it is offloaded from the conveyance? 
 
3. What is the policy and legal basis for this determination? 
 
4. Who will take final possession of the interdicted item? What is the policy and legal basis 
for this determination? 
 
5. Who is responsible for compensating the ship/aircraft owner/operator and/or any other 
claimants (container companies, other potential claimants with cargo on the ship) for any 
delay? What is the policy and legal basis for this determination? 
 
6. What information is required to support actions against persons or companies involved in 
this proliferation stream? How will this information impact the storage, possession, and 
disposition of the item? 
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PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE 
NEWPORT 2014 
FUNCTIONAL ISSUE TEMPLATE 
 
Issue for discussion: 
1. What elements were common in your approaches? 
2. What elements were different in your approaches? 
3. What accounts for differences, if any, in approaches to this issue? 
4. Which approach, if any, may be more effective? Why? 
5. For the following questions, please refer to CCP tool list on left. 
6. Identify any existing CCP tools that relate to this issue. 
7. Describe how these CCP tools could be strengthened.  
8. If no tool exits, provide a description of a useful CCP tool. (e.g., model national 
legislation, checklist,…)  
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Annex B: Individual Player Questionnaire  
 
Proliferation Security Initiative 2014  
 
INTRODUCTION:  The purpose of this survey is to provide timely and candid feedback 
regarding your experience over the last three days. Your feedback will inform post-game 
analysis and planning efforts for next year’s Operational Experts Group meeting.   Ultimately, 
your responses will greatly assist the PSI community counter the growing challenge posed by the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related 
materials worldwide. This survey should take no more than 10 minutes to complete. Your 
comments are not for attribution and will be analyzed in aggregate.  
 
Demographics 
 
Country: 
Discipline:  Diplomatic □     Military □     Customs/Law Enforcement □     Financial □     Legal 
□      
                     Other (list):                                 
 
PSI Experience No prior 
experience 
1 - 11 
months 
1-3 
years 
More 
than 3 
years 
The length of my experience with the PSI is:     
 
PSI Exercise Experience None    1-3   4-6 7 or 
more 
Before this event, the number of PSI exercises, games, or 
workshops I have attended (not including OEG meetings): 
    
 
For each of the questions listed below, please circle the value that most closely represents your 
perspective having now completed the event. 
 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Uncertain  
4 
Agree  
5 
Strongly 
Agree  
1. I have gained a greater 
appreciation of how ratification 
and eventual entry into force of 
the Beijing Convention on the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Relating to International Civil 
Aviation changes the status quo 
with respect to counter-
proliferation laws, policies, 
practices, and obligations. 
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1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Uncertain  
4 
Agree  
5 
Strongly 
Agree  
2. I have gained a better 
understanding of international 
standards, national laws, 
policies, and terminology 
related to shipments in transit 
and transshipment among PSI 
member states.  
 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Uncertain  
4 
Agree  
5 
Strongly 
Agree  
3. I have gained a deeper 
understanding of the key issues 
and challenges related to 
disposition and liability aspects 
of PSI. 
 
 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Uncertain  
4 
Agree  
5 
Strongly 
Agree  
4. I have gained a deeper 
understanding of how national 
laws, policies and procedures 
differ amongst PSI OEG 
member states.  
 
 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Uncertain  
4 
Agree  
5 
Strongly 
Agree  
5. In order to address 
impediments to effective 
interdiction of prohibited 
materials during shipment and 
transshipment, it appears that 
existing CCP tools need to be 
strengthened.  
 
 
 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Uncertain  
4 
Agree  
5 
Strongly 
Agree  
6. In order to address 
impediments to effective 
interdiction of prohibited 
materials during shipment and 
transshipment, it appears that 
that new CCP tools need to be 
developed.   
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1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Uncertain  
4 
Agree  
5 
Strongly 
Agree  
7. In order to overcome 
challenges resulting from 
ratification or non-ratification of 
the Beijing Convention, it 
appears that existing CCP tools 
need to be strengthened. 
 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Uncertain  
4 
Agree  
5 
Strongly 
Agree  
8. In order to overcome 
challenges resulting from 
ratification or non-ratification of 
the Beijing Convention, it 
appears that new CCP tools 
need to be developed.   
 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Uncertain  
4 
Agree  
5 
Strongly 
Agree  
9. In order to address the 
disposition and liability 
challenges identified during the 
game, it appears that existing 
CCP tools need to be 
strengthened. 
 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Uncertain  
4 
Agree  
5 
Strongly 
Agree  
10. In order to address the 
disposition and liability 
challenges identified during the 
event, it appears that new CCP 
tools need to be developed. 
 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Uncertain  
4 
Agree  
5 
Strongly 
Agree  
11.  Having subject matters 
experts present at the event 
helped inform my actions 
during the game.   
 
 
12. Based on two days of game play and reflection, what key words or phrases summarize the 
major THEMES of this game? 
 
13. Based on your experience over the last three days, what specific areas should the OEG 
further explore?  
 
14.  How could OEG meetings be improved? 
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15. How could the Tabletop Exercise have been improved?  
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Annex C: Facilitator Questions  
 
Aluminum 7075 
Section 11 Country Cluster Plenary Moderator Questions 
 What if Country POPLAR is unwilling to take the risk, due to insufficient information, to 
take the interdiction action?  
 In addition to interdiction actions, did the countries contact Country PINE regarding the 
network supporting this transaction? 
 If Country POPLAR agrees to conduct the interdiction, who is financially responsible for 
the interdiction-related actions? 
 If given the choice, would your government want to make this interdiction public? Why 
or why not? (Common to all short forms) 
Section 12 Functional Plenary Moderator Questions 
 Does your diplomatic approach cover just the suspect ship or does it attempt to begin to 
address the network? (ie. The suspect broker in Pine) 
Analog to Digital Converters 
Section 11 Country Cluster Plenary Moderator Questions 
 What happens if Green doesn’t take action? What are the risks if you don’t take action? 
 Who is responsible for paying for any port service fees for the offloading, handling, and 
temporary storage of the item at the venue for disposition? 
 How, when, and under what circumstances (specific conveyance, who is paying, timing, 
security) will the item be sent to its location of final disposition? 
 What other disposition issues arise in this case and what are the specific decisions and 
actions you are taking to resolve them? 
 If given the choice, would your government want to make this interdiction public? Why 
or why not? (Common to all short forms) 
Section 12 Functional Plenary Moderator Questions 
  What are the key issues associated with disposition and liability? 
Chemical Engineer 
Section 11 Country Cluster Plenary Moderator Questions 
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 Who is responsible for paying for any port service fees for the offloading, handling, and 
temporary storage of the item at the venue for disposition? 
 How, when, and under what circumstances (specific conveyance, who is paying, timing, 
security) will the item be sent to its location of final disposition? 
 What other disposition issues arise in this case and what are the specific decisions and 
actions you are taking to resolve them? 
 If given the choice, would your government want to make this interdiction public? Why 
or why not? 
 What influence does the country which put the person of interest on the watch list have 
on the disposition? 
Section 12 Functional Plenary Moderator Questions 
  Diplomatic Discussion 
o How does interdiction relate to bilateral or multilateral initiatives you might 
pursue against these emerging countries of proliferation concern?  
 Legal Discussion 
o What role, if any, does the fact that you are a Beijing signatory (and it is in force) 
play? Note that Ash is also a Beijing signatory. 
Corrosion-Resistant Valves 
Section 11 Country Cluster Plenary Moderator Questions 
 Without a UNSCR, what authorities does the Beijing Convention offer to support 
interdiction actions? 
 Is a chemical program in Flint significant enough for an interdiction against a neutral 
country in the absence of a UNSCR? 
 If given the choice, would your government want to make this interdiction public? Why 
or why not? (Common to all short forms) 
 If Green was in a collective defense agreement with a country neighboring Flint, does 
Green’s collective defense obligation require it to take action?  
Section 12 Functional Plenary Moderator Questions 
  None 
Gas Monitoring System 
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Section 11 Country Cluster Plenary Moderator Questions 
 What if this situation included a person and an item? 
 Who is responsible for paying for any port service fees for the offloading, handling, and 
temporary storage of the item at the venue for disposition? 
 How, when, and under what circumstances (specific conveyance, who is paying, timing, 
security) will the item be sent to its location of final disposition? 
 What other disposition issues arise in this case and what are the specific decisions and 
actions you are taking to resolve them? 
 If given the choice, would your government want to make this interdiction public? Why 
or why not? 
 What if this had not been a controlled item? Do you have a “catch all” provision in 
national legislation? 
Section 12 Functional Plenary Moderator Questions 
  Is this scenario a transit or a transshipment issue? 
 If there is a difference, how does it matter in relation to authorities and the availability of 
information?  
Glass-Lined Reactor Vessel 
Section 11 Country Cluster Plenary Moderator Questions 
 If WALNUT were a Beijing Convention signatory, how would that change your COA? 
 If Green Intel nexus is not sufficient, what other connection to the proliferation event 
would cause you to act? 
 If 4 hours is insufficient to demarche the other countries involved, what changes in Green 
interagency processes could make the system more responsive? 
 If given the choice, would your government want to make this interdiction public? Why 
or why not? (Common to all short forms) 
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Section 12 Functional Plenary Moderator Questions 
 None. 
Gyroscopes 
Section 11 Country Cluster Plenary Moderator Questions 
 If given the choice, would your government want to make this interdiction public? Why 
or why not? (Common to all short forms) 
Section 12 Functional Plenary Moderator Questions 
  None. 
Hydrogen Fluoride 
Section 11 Country Cluster Plenary Moderator Questions 
 Because there is no UNSCR, what legal authorities and political requirements guide your 
actions? 
 How do economic risks affect Green’s decision to take/not take interdiction actions?  
 If given the choice, would your government want to make this interdiction public? Why 
or why not? (Common to all short forms) 
Section 12 Functional Plenary Moderator Questions 
  Is there a difference in authorities and information availability if the items are in transit 
vice transshipment (in and out of the free trade zone)? 
 Diplomatic Discussion 
o How does interdiction relate to bilateral or multilateral initiatives you might 
pursue against these emerging countries of proliferation concern? 
Kynar Piping 
Section 11 Country Cluster Plenary Moderator Questions 
 How does movement through a free trade zone affect the legal authorities to conduct 
interdiction actions? 
 If given the choice, would your government want to make this interdiction public? Why 
or why not? (Common to all short forms) 
Section 12 Functional Plenary Moderator Questions 
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 Is there a difference in authorities and information availability if the items are in transit 
vice transshipment (in and out of the free trade zone)? 
 Diplomatic Discussion 
o How does interdiction relate to bilateral or multilateral initiatives you might 
pursue against these emerging countries of proliferation concern?  
Radiation-Hardened Microcircuits 
Section 11 Country Cluster Plenary Moderator Questions 
 Who is responsible for paying for any port service fees for the offloading, handling, and 
temporary storage of the item at the venue for disposition? 
 How, when, and under what circumstances (specific conveyance, who is paying, timing, 
security) will the item be sent to its location of final disposition? 
 What other disposition issues arise in this case and what are the specific decisions and 
actions you are taking to resolve them? 
 If given the choice, would your government want to make this interdiction public? Why 
or why not? 
 Describe your risk calculation regarding the intelligence from a third party and your 
decision to conduct an interdiction action. 
 What would change if this aircraft was conducting cargo operations (opening the cargo 
bay and handling the cargo) or if the item was being transshipped in your country? 
 What cargo company does the ops? Who pays them?  
 Does the manifest have to say circuit boards for printers? Or something that is closer?  
 How long to do the ops take? Do any unscheduled cargo operations cause the airline to 
pay?  
 Do Customs authorities allow ordering cargo operations when none were scheduled?  
 Is there a customs liability issue if your customs guy doesn’t have sovereign immunity? 
 Cost issue for the airline of delays? Who do I send the bill to?  
 What if no crew swap: crew expires if takes long?  
Section 12 Functional Plenary Moderator Questions 
   What are the key issues associated with disposition and liability? 
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Rocket Engines 
Section 11 Country Cluster Plenary Moderator Questions 
 Disposition and liability questions WRT GINGKO involvement: Do countries have 
policies or resources to help GINGKO dispose of the rocket motors either by taking them 
or destroying them in place. 
 How does Master verses Flag State consent impact any interdiction actions? 
 What changes if M/V HAMMERHEAD 7 flies Country QUARTZ flag? 
 What are Country GINKO’s obligations in this scenario, and how did you convince them 
of these obligations? 
 If given the choice, would your government want to make this interdiction public? Why 
or why not? (Common to all short forms) 
Section 12 Functional Plenary Moderator Questions 
 Military Discussion 
o What assumptions did you make about command and control and the rules of 
engagement (ROE)? 
o How realistic is it to make these ROE assumptions? 
Rocket Fuel Oxidizer 
Section 11 Country Cluster Plenary Moderator Questions 
 
 Is the oxidizer considered military material? 
 If Country ELM rejects taking action, what are the options for the vessels taking part in 
the exercise? 
 If countries decide not to take action with their military forces, would a different end user 
(Granite) or a different item (nuclear weapons related) change your calculus? 
 If given the choice, would your government want to make this interdiction public? Why 
or why not? (Common to all short forms) 
Section 12 Functional Plenary Moderator Questions 
 Diplomatic Discussion 
o Does your diplomatic approach cover just the suspect ship or does it attempt to 
begin to address the network (ie. The suspect broker in Pine) 
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 Legal Discussion 
o If the Lawyers focus on Elm’s legal obligations under the UNSCR, follow with a 
question regarding the responsibilities under the UNSCR for countries with naval 
forces in the exercise area. 
 Military Discussion 
o What assumptions did you make about command and control and the rules of 
engagement (ROE)? 
o How realistic is it to make these ROE assumptions? 
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Annex D. Participant List 
  
COUNTRY: 
MILITARY RANK / CIVILIAN 
POSITION 
ORGANIZATION / 
COMMAND 
Argentina Prefecto 
Prefectura Naval 
Argentina 
Australia 
Counsellor Americas 
Australian Customs and 
Border Protection Service 
Legal Officer 
Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade 
Executive Officer, Counter-
Proliferation Section 
Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade 
Assistant Secretary Arms 
Control (Acting) 
Australian Defence 
Department 
Canada 
Policy Officer 
Department of National 
Defence 
Senior Policy Officer 
Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Trade, and 
Development Canada 
Deputy Director Proliferation 
Security Unit 
Department of National 
Defence 
Counsel 
Department of Justice, 
Canada Border Services 
Agency Legal Services 
Unit 
Policy Analyst Public Safety Canada 
France 
General Secretariat for 
Defense 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MR Ministry of foreign affairs 
Chargé de mission SGDSN 
Legal adviser Ministry of defense 
Customs Attache Deputy french customs 
Political councellor Foreign Affairs 
Counselor MoFA 
Germany 
Counseler 
German 
Embassy/Department of 
Homeland Security 
Senior Counsellor Ministry of Defense 
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Senior Expert Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Japan 
Major 
Defense Policy Division, 
Ministry of Defense 
Commander 
J3, Joint Staff Office, 
Japan Self Defense Force 
Senior Deputy Director MOFA 
CDR Japan Coast Guard 
Researcher 
Japan International 
Transport Institute 
Joint Staff Ministry of Defense 
Official 
Non-Proliferation, Science 
and Nuclear Division 
New Zealand   NZ Customs 
Norway 
Senior Adviser Ministry of Justice 
Adviser 
Norwegian Ministry of 
Trade and Industry 
Adviser 
CUSTOMS 
ADMINISTRATION 
Senior adviser 
NO Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Senior Adviser 
Norwegian Defense 
Command 
Police superintendent 
Norwegian Police Service 
(PST) 
Director MFA Norway 
Poland 
Head of Division MFA of Poland 
CDR 
Inspectorate of the Polish 
Navy 
Third Secretary 
Permanent Mission of 
Poland to the UN in New 
York 
Customs Officer MINISTRY OF FINANCE 
Portugal Lieutenant Colonel PoAF / MoD 
Republic of 
Korea 
  MoFA 
Policy Planner MoFA 
  MoD 
Singapore 
Deputy Director (Policy) Ministry of Defense 
Assistant Head, Trade 
Strategy and Security 
Branch 
Singapore Customs 
State Counsel 
Attorney-General’s 
Chambers 
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Chief Counsel of Civil 
Division 
Attorney-General’s 
Chambers 
Deputy Senior State 
Counsel 
Attorney-General’s 
Chambers 
Assistant Director 
Singapore Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Policy Officer Ministry of Defence 
Deputy Director (Policy) Ministry of Defence 
Spain 
Head of Non-proliferation of 
CW 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Captain Civil Guard 
Team Leader 
Comisaria General De 
Informacion 
OF-5 (Navy) 
Defence Policy 
Directorate 
The 
Netherlands 
CAPT(N) MoD - The Netherlands 
Turkey 
Expert Prime Ministry 
CDR (N) Turkish General Staff 
Head of Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
UK 
Counsellor, Deputy Head Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Desk Officer Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Desk Officer Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
USA 
LCDR USPACOM 
GS OSD Policy/CWMD 
CWMD IA Coord. Specialist DTRA/SCC-WMD 
Commander / USN DTRA/SCC-WMD 
CIV GS-14 OSD-Policy 
DASD OSD-Policy 
CIV GS-14 
US Customs and Border 
Protection 
CIV GS-14 
US Customs and Border 
Protection 
Assistant Deputy Director ODNI/NCPC/ICPF 
CIV USSOUTHCOM 
GS-15 
U.S. Department of 
Defense 
Facilitator DTRA 
LtCol HQ USAF (AF/JAO) 
Foreign Affairs Specialist DOE/NNSA Office 
SES US Dept of State 
 
 
68 
 
LCDR State 
LtCol Joint Staff/J5 
Supervisory Special Agent FBI 
CIV USCENTCOM 
CIV Nat'l Security Council 
CIV / GS-14 OSD-Public Affairs 
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Annex E: Fictional Country Background Information  
Country Granite 
Granite is widely viewed as a country of proliferation concern and many believe their declared civil 
uranium enrichment program is a cover for an effort to secretly build nuclear weapons. Granite’s 
response has been to stonewall and deceive the IAEA and be largely uncooperative. UNSCR 2904 
was adopted in May 2013 to address these concerns.  In contravention, Granite continues to 
enrich uranium for “peaceful purposes” and maintains an active research and development 
program. They have over the years developed a sophisticated global procurement program that 
manages to be moderately successful in bypassing sanctions, trade restrictions and other 
international efforts to encourage their compliance with UN and IAEA requests. Granite has 
been openly defiant of the international community’s efforts to limit its illicit programs and has 
directed hostile rhetoric toward countries that supported the UNSCR, including Green. Granite 
has limited economic and cultural connections with Green that fluctuate with the political 
relationship. 
Granite’s program to develop an indigenous ballistic missile production capability over the past 
decade has been met with moderate success. They have produced a relatively large number of both 
solid fueled and liquid fueled short and medium range ballistic missiles (SRBM/MRBM) that have 
proven to be somewhat unreliable and woefully inaccurate for their needs. To remediate these 
deficiencies, Granite has recently begun looking to outside sources for components that will increase 
both the reliability and accuracy of their SRBM/MRBM ballistic missile forces. According to 
sensitive intelligence, Granite is specifically looking for advanced gyroscopes, radiation hardened 
micro-circuits and military grade analog to digital convertors. They may also be looking to procure 
solid fuel rocket engines for their prototype intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM). 
Since being designated a country of proliferation concern, Granite has denied interdicted cargoes 
were destined for WMD end-uses, asserting legitimate industrial applications for dual- use 
commodities. Merchant vessels operated by Granite’s state shipping company have exhibited 
mixed cooperation—at times responding with hostility—toward countries attempting to examine 
shipments of possible proliferation concern. In response to previous cargo seizures, Granite’s 
procurement network has adopted increasingly complex logistics practices, including using routes 
that minimize or exclude transshipment and shipping with Granite’s national carrier, suggesting 
future interdiction opportunities may be scant. Granite’s response to previous interdiction efforts 
has been largely rhetorical, including threatening (but not carrying out) military action. Four years 
of international sanctions and general economic mismanagement have diminished Granite’s ability 
to respond using economic levers, and Granite’s diminished international clout/position also 
leaves few diplomatic options. Granite has the capacity to respond regionally through a range of 
military activities, ranging from limited conventional military anti-access and area-denial actions to 
ballistic missile / asymmetric operations aimed at interfering with the regional commercial and 
military activities of those who attempt to enforce the UNSCR, including Green. 
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Country Quartz 
Quartz is a declared nuclear power and widely viewed as a country of proliferation concern. After 
conducting nuclear tests in 2010 and 2011, Quartz announced in 2012 that it had developed a 
nuclear weapon. Green intelligence assessments are in general agreement that Quartz possesses a 
small stockpile of relatively simple nuclear weapons. They also assess that Quartz has a large 
chemical weapons capability. Since 2010, Quartz is no longer a party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.  UNSCR 2846 was adopted in June 2012 to address these concerns. In 
contravention, Quartz continues to enrich uranium and manufacture plutonium, and it maintains 
an active nuclear weapons research and development program. They have over the years 
developed a relatively unsophisticated global procurement program that manages to be minimally 
successful in bypassing sanctions, trade restrictions and other international efforts to encourage 
their compliance with UN and IAEA requests. Quartz has been openly defiant of the international 
community’s efforts to limit its illicit programs and has directed hostile rhetoric toward countries 
that supported the UNSCR, including Green. Quartz has limited economic and cultural 
connections with Green that fluctuate with the political relationship. 
Quartz is seeking to improve and expand its nuclear weapons capabilities, in particular its 
production of fissile material. It has recently begun exporting ballistic missile related materials and 
components in order to generate revenue to import fissile material processing related equipment. 
Since the announcement of the UNSCR against Quartz’s WMD program and related procurement 
efforts, Quartz has exhibited a heightened posture of hostility toward those who attempt to enforce 
it, including Green. Merchant vessels operated by Quartz’s national fleet act in a belligerent fashion 
with the threat of retaliatory violence toward countries attempting to examine shipments of possible 
proliferation concern. However, Quartz has responded semi- positively to diplomatic outreach by 
third countries with relatively close relationships to Quartz, though such outreach is infrequent and 
rarely effective. In response to previous cargo seizures, procurement and supplier networks for 
Quartz have probably resorted to operating under further anonymity through using foreign 
intermodal shipping services vice Quartz’s national carrier. Such measures include shipping from 
Quartz ports to major regional hub ports aboard Quartz-operated feeder services and transferring 
falsely declared cargoes to other foreign carriers for delivery to the ultimate end users. Future 
interdiction options may be more ample, but detection becomes more of a challenge.  
Quartz typically seeks external support to lobby in favor of Quartz’s own interests, but largely does 
not publically acknowledge any interdictions and would not be expected to threaten military action. 
International sanctions, domestic economic policies, and broader political corruption have crippled 
Quartz’s economy, thus diminishing their ability to respond using economic levers. Additionally, 
Quartz has diplomatically alienated itself over years of internationally-defiant activity and has 
virtually no viable diplomatic options. Quartz has very limited capacity to strike far from its borders 
with its conventional military forces, but could threaten regional allies of GREEN. Quartz could also 
threaten further nuclear testing and use rhetoric to indicate its ability to strike at some distance with 
its ballistic missile force if Green or others continue to interfere in its military technology 
agreements with its customers. 
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Country Flint 
Flint is not generally viewed as a country of proliferation concern. They have procured a 
substantial short-range conventional ballistic force over the past decade and are considered 
moderately proficient as evidenced by their testing & exercising regimes. Until recently, they have 
had no identified WMD program. While Flint has its fair share of internal disputes and discontent, 
they are generally considered stable. There is however a long-simmering regional dispute that has 
over the past few years elevated in its intensity. The UN Secretary General has issued a number of 
statements calling for all parties to work towards peaceful resolution of the regional disputes which 
include aspects of territory, economic and security. 
Flint’s relationship with Green is not characterized by either close political ties or open 
political/diplomatic hostility. Key points to the relationship include commercial trade, low-level 
military and cultural exchanges and events and even some limited sales of military equipment. 
Recent intelligence acquired by Green suggests a regime desire for a chemical weapons capability 
to address what Flint perceives as a growing conventional imbalance with a regional antagonist and 
to serve as a deterrent against adventurism.  Flint is assessed to have an on- going secretive 
program to develop, procure and import materials and equipment necessary to develop an 
offensive CW capability, and likely relies on their national shipping companies as well as foreign 
shipping lines to deliver CW-applicable materials that is cannot produce or develop indigenously. 
Some Green analysts believe the procurement effort is more mature than originally predicted and 
may indeed be close to break-out. 
According to sensitive intelligence, Flint has recently begun looking to outside sources for what 
may be the final components necessary to achieve a limited CW production capability. Flint is 
specifically looking for corrosion resistant valves (CRV), Hydrogen Fluoride and Kynar Piping. 
Flint, if aware of interdiction activity, would likely respond with denial, asserting industrial 
applications for WMD-applicable commodities, and would likely protest through diplomatic 
channels and threaten opposition to Green political initiatives in international bodies. Flint 
procurement networks would likely respond to interdictions by adopting delivery mechanisms 
perceived to offer more security. 
Country Shale 
Shale is a country of proliferation concern and has a substantial ballistic missile program and a 
large chemical weapons program (gravity bombs, rockets, artillery, and other sub-BM delivery 
systems). Embroiled in sectarian violence Shale is in the midst of declining into civil war. The 
UNSC is monitoring the situation closely and has issued a number of resolutions calling for a 
peaceful resolution of the internal security situation but none are specifically focused on their 
WMD program and related proliferation concerns. 
Recent intelligence acquired by Green suggests a regime desire for a chemical weapons capability 
to address what Shale perceives as shortcomings in their conventional ability to deter anti-regime 
forces from further sectarian violence. Specifically, Shale desires to develop a ballistic missile 
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warhead capable of delivering a chemical weapon payload.  Some Green analysts believe the Shale 
development effort has hit a significant roadblock and that Shale lacks the technical expertise to 
overcome this challenge. 
According to sensitive intelligence, Shale has recently begun looking to outside sources for this 
technical expertise. They also are attempting to procure and import glass-lined reactor vessels 
(GLRV) and a gas monitoring system (GMS) to facilitate their ballistic missile chemical warhead 
research and development effort. The Shale military has an established relationship with Shale 
Research University (SRU) and periodically has used the University as a front for the procurement 
of controlled or particularly sensitive materials. 
Shale has a moderately confrontational relationship with Green which occasionally includes openly 
hostile rhetoric and opposition to Green political initiatives in international bodies. Shale has 
limited economic and cultural connections with Green that fluctuate with the political relationship. 
Any discernible response to interdictions by Shale would likely be limited to changes in practices 
by procurement networks, including the adoption of delivery methods perceived to offer more 
security and increased communications security. In contrast to Granite, Quartz and Flint, Shale 
has no national merchant fleet and must, in addition to their national air cargo service, rely on an 
array of foreign shipping lines for delivery of WMD-related procurements. 
 
PSIOEG 2014 Game - Other Countries 
ASH 
This country has a moderately confrontational relationship with Green which occasionally includes 
heated rhetoric and opposition to Green political initiatives in international bodies. This country 
has limited economic and cultural connections with Green that fluctuate with the political 
relationship. This country regularly rejects requests for cooperation on interdiction cases. This 
country has an evolving interagency process, some implementing legislation, and participates 
sporadically in interdiction workshops and conferences. Its policies and procedures related to 
interdiction are evolving, and its capabilities to translate policy decisions in rapid action are 
untested and/or uncertain. 
BAMBOO 
This country’s relationship with Green is not characterized by either close political ties or open 
political/diplomatic hostility. This country has traded and cooperated with Green on a sporadic 
and issue-by-issue basis. This country has not yet been asked to cooperate in interdiction cases. 
This country has a mature interagency process, implementing legislation and regularly 
practices/exercise its policies and procedures. The government has a good relationship with 
national industries involved in manufacture, exports, and shipping. 
BIRCH 
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This country’s relationship with Green is one of an ally or close partner that has positive diplomatic, 
economic, military, and cultural relations. This country has cooperated frequently, takes the lead in 
interdiction cases when national interests are potentially at risk, and has had an information threshold 
for action that has been reasonable in the past. This country has a mature interagency process, 
implementing legislation and regularly practices/exercise its policies and procedures. The 
government has a good relationship with national industries involved in manufacture, exports, and 
shipping. 
CEDAR 
This country’s relationship with Green is not characterized by either close political ties or open 
political/diplomatic hostility. This country has traded and cooperated with Green on a sporadic and 
issue-by-issue basis. This country has not yet been asked to cooperate in interdiction cases. This 
country has an evolving interagency process, some implementing legislation, and participates 
sporadically in interdiction workshops and conferences. Its policies and procedures related to 
interdiction are evolving, and its capabilities to translate policy decisions in rapid action are untested 
and/or uncertain. 
CHERRY 
Major trading partner with Quartz. This country has an adversarial relationship with Green which 
includes openly hostile rhetoric and opposition to Green political initiatives in international bodies. 
This country has limited economic and cultural connections with Green that fluctuate with the 
political relationship. This country regularly rejects requests for cooperation on interdiction cases. 
This country has an evolving interagency process, some implementing legislation, and participates 
sporadically in interdiction workshops and conferences. Its policies and procedures related to 
interdiction are evolving, and its capabilities to translate policy decisions in rapid action are untested 
and/or uncertain. 
COCONUT 
Country COCONUT has a rich maritime history. They are known around the world as a leader in 
developing highly qualified mariners. This country’s relationship with Green is not characterized by 
either close political ties or open political/diplomatic hostility. This country has traded and 
cooperated with Green on a sporadic and issue-by-issue basis. This country has cooperated 
sporadically with Green on interdiction cases, often requires significant information 
sharing/evidence, and rarely takes lead. It has been defensive of its own ability to control/monitor 
activities of its companies/nationals. This country has a very limited interagency process, lacks key 
implementing national legislation, and has a low level of knowledge of international counter-
proliferation laws and norms. It has few existing policies and procedures, and it is unlikely to have 
the ability to translate policies and decisions into rapid action. 
EBONY 
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Major trading partner with Quartz. They have regional security concerns and have developed a 
ballistic missile program that is reliant on imported technology and rocket fuel primarily from 
Quartz. This country has a moderately confrontational relationship with Green which occasionally 
includes openly hostile rhetoric and opposition to Green political initiatives in international bodies. 
This country has limited economic and cultural connections with Green that fluctuate with the 
political relationship. This country has not yet been asked to cooperate in interdiction cases. This 
country has a very limited interagency process, lacks key implementing national legislation, and has 
a low level of knowledge of international counter-proliferation laws and norms. It has few existing 
policies and procedures, and it is unlikely to have the ability to translate policies and decisions into 
rapid action. 
ELM 
Strategically located along a major SLOC, Elm is cognizant of their global reputation as a maritime 
hub, and it generates the majority of its income from maritime trade related sources. This country’s 
relationship with Green is one of an ally or close partner that has positive diplomatic, economic, 
military, and cultural relations. This country has cooperated sporadically with Green on interdiction 
cases, often requires significant information sharing/evidence, and rarely takes lead. It has been 
defensive of its own ability to control/monitor activities of its companies/nationals. This country 
has a mature interagency process, implementing legislation and regularly practices/exercise its 
policies and procedures. The government has a good relationship with national industries involved 
in manufacture, exports, and shipping. 
GINGKO 
This country’s relationship with Green is not characterized by either close political ties or open 
political/diplomatic hostility. This country has traded and cooperated with Green on a sporadic and 
issue-by-issue basis. This country has cooperated sporadically with Green on interdiction cases, 
often requires significant information sharing/evidence, and rarely takes lead. It has been defensive 
of its own ability to control/monitor activities of its companies/nationals. This country has an 
evolving interagency process, some implementing legislation, and participates sporadically in 
interdiction workshops and conferences. Its policies and procedures related to interdiction are 
evolving, and its capabilities to translate policy decisions in rapid action are untested and/or 
uncertain. 
MAPLE 
This country’s relationship with Green is not characterized by either close political ties or open 
political/diplomatic hostility. This country has traded and cooperated with Green on a sporadic and 
issue-by-issue basis. This country has cooperated sporadically with Green on interdiction cases, 
often requires significant information sharing/evidence, and rarely takes lead. It has been defensive 
of its own ability to control/monitor activities of its companies/nationals. This country has an 
evolving interagency process, some implementing legislation, and participates sporadically in 
interdiction workshops and conferences. Its policies and procedures related to interdiction are 
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evolving, and its capabilities to translate policy decisions in rapid action are untested and/or 
uncertain. 
MOHAGONY 
This country’s relationship with Green is one of an ally or close partner that has positive diplomatic, 
economic, military, and cultural relations. This country has cooperated frequently, takes the lead in 
interdiction cases when national interests are potentially at risk, and has had an information 
threshold for action that has been reasonable in the past. This country has a mature interagency 
process, implementing legislation and regularly practices/exercise its policies and procedures. The 
government has a good relationship with national industries involved in manufacture, exports, and 
shipping. 
OAK 
This country’s relationship with Green is one of an ally or close partner that has positive diplomatic, 
economic, military, and cultural relations. This country has cooperated frequently, takes the lead in 
interdiction cases when national interests are potentially at risk, and has had an information 
threshold for action that has been reasonable in the past. This country has a mature interagency 
process, implementing legislation and regularly practices/exercise its policies and procedures. The 
government has a good relationship with national industries involved in manufacture, exports, and 
shipping. 
PECAN 
Pecan is a flag of convenience state. This country’s relationship with Green is not characterized by 
either close political ties or open political/diplomatic hostility. This country has traded and 
cooperated with Green on a sporadic and issue-by-issue basis. This country has cooperated 
sporadically with Green on interdiction cases, often requires significant information 
sharing/evidence, and rarely takes lead. It has been defensive of its own ability to control/monitor 
activities of its companies/nationals. This country has a very limited interagency process, lacks key 
implementing national legislation, and has a low level  of knowledge of international counter-
proliferation laws and norms. It has few existing policies and procedures, and it is unlikely to have 
the ability to translate policies and decisions into rapid action. 
PINE 
This country’s relationship with Green is not characterized by either close political ties or open 
political/diplomatic hostility. This country has strong economic connections with Green that 
fluctuate with the political relationship. This country regularly rejects requests for cooperation on 
interdiction cases. This country has an evolving interagency process, some implementing legislation, 
and participates sporadically in interdiction workshops and conferences. Its policies and procedures 
related to interdiction are evolving, and its capabilities to translate policy decisions in rapid action 
are untested and/or uncertain. 
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POPLAR 
This country’s relationship with Green is one of an ally or close partner that has positive diplomatic, 
economic, military, and cultural relations. This country has cooperated sporadically with Green on 
interdiction cases, often requires significant information sharing/evidence, and rarely takes lead. It 
has been defensive of its own ability to control/monitor activities of its companies/nationals. This 
country has a mature interagency process, implementing legislation and regularly practices/exercise 
its policies and procedures. The government has a good relationship with national industries 
involved in manufacture, exports, and shipping. 
REDWOOD 
This country’s relationship with Green is not characterized by either close political ties or open 
political/diplomatic hostility. This country has traded and cooperated with Green on a sporadic and 
issue-by-issue basis. This country has not yet been asked to cooperate in interdiction cases. This 
country has an evolving interagency process, some implementing legislation, and participates 
sporadically in interdiction workshops and conferences. Its policies and procedures related to 
interdiction are evolving, and its capabilities to translate policy decisions in rapid action are untested 
and/or uncertain. 
SPRUCE 
This country’s relationship with Green is not characterized by either close political ties or open 
political/diplomatic hostility. This country has traded and cooperated with Green on a sporadic and 
issue-by-issue basis. This country has cooperated sporadically with Green on interdiction cases, 
often requires significant information sharing/evidence, and rarely takes lead. It has been defensive 
of its own ability to control/monitor activities of its companies/nationals. This country has an 
evolving interagency process, some implementing legislation, and participates sporadically in 
interdiction workshops and conferences. Its policies and procedures related to interdiction are 
evolving, and its capabilities to translate policy decisions in rapid action are untested and/or 
uncertain. 
TEAK 
This country’s relationship with Green is not characterized by either close political ties or open 
political/diplomatic hostility. This country has traded and cooperated with Green on a sporadic and 
issue-by-issue basis. This country has not yet been asked to cooperate in interdiction cases. This 
country has an evolving interagency process, some implementing legislation, and participates 
sporadically in interdiction workshops and conferences. Its policies and procedures related to 
interdiction are evolving, and its capabilities to translate policy decisions in rapid action are untested 
and/or uncertain. 
WALNUT 
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This country’s relationship with Green is not characterized by either close political ties or open 
political/diplomatic hostility. This country has traded and cooperated with Green on a sporadic and 
issue-by-issue basis. This country has cooperated sporadically with Green on interdiction cases, 
often requires significant information sharing/evidence, and rarely takes lead. Recently, Walnut has 
become increasingly litigious when cases have involved goods produced by Walnut manufacturers 
being delayed or seized. It has been defensive of its own ability to control/monitor activities of its 
companies/nationals. This country has an evolving interagency process, some implementing 
legislation, and participates sporadically in interdiction workshops and conferences. Its policies and 
procedures related to interdiction are evolving, and its capabilities to translate policy decisions in 
rapid action are untested and/or uncertain. 
WILLOW 
This country’s relationship with Green is not characterized by either close political ties or open 
political/diplomatic hostility. This country has traded and cooperated with Green on a sporadic and 
issue-by-issue basis. This country has cooperated sporadically with Green on interdiction cases, 
often requires significant information sharing/evidence, and rarely takes lead. It has been defensive 
of its own ability to control/monitor activities of its companies/nationals. This country has an 
evolving interagency process, some implementing legislation, and participates sporadically in 
interdiction workshops and conferences. Its policies and procedures related to interdiction are 
evolving, and its capabilities to translate policy decisions in rapid action are untested and/or 
uncertain. 
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Annex F: Treaty and Regime Matrix 
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Annex G: Fictional United Nation Security Council Resolutions 2846 and 2904 
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